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Abstract
In this paper we introduce arbitrary arrow update logic (AAUL). The logic
AAUL takes arrow update logic, a dynamic epistemic logic where the accessi-
bility relations of agents are updated rather than the set of possible worlds, and
adds a quantifier over such arrow updates.
We investigate the relative expressivity of AAUL compared to other logics,
most notably arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL). Additionally, we
show that the model checking problem for AAUL is PSPACE-complete. Finally,
we introduce a proof system for AAUL, and prove it to be sound and complete.
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1. Introduction
In dynamic epistemic logic [16] various information changing events can be
modeled, from modest public announcements, to powerful action models that
can change an epistemic model beyond recognition. Here, we study arrow up-
dates, a type of information changing event that is more powerful than public
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announcements but less powerful than action models. Roughly speaking, in
public announcement logic (PAL [28]) one specifies which states in the model
will remain as a result of the announcement, in arrow update logic (AUL [22])
one puts constraints on pairs in relations that endure the update (while in ac-
tion model logic, also new states and new pairs can emerge as a result of the
action). Let us emphasise at this point that although such relations can denote
indistinguishability for an agent between states, they can also denote any kind
of transition between states, or a temporal relation, a preference, etc. In other
words, arrow update logic is relevant for many logics that are used in Artificial
Intelligence, whether these logics model epistemic, doxastic or other attitudes of
agents, dynamics, strategic interaction, or systems of norms (see also Section 2).
One line of dynamic epistemic logics adds quantifiers over information chang-
ing events, ranging from quantifiers over public announcements [10, 5], group
announcements [2], to quantifiers over action models [5]. An overview of the lit-
erature on this topic is provided by [14]. These different “quantified operator”
logics find their application in analyzing the concept of knowability [10], but also
in, e.g., security where one can express properties like no information changing
event can disclose certain information to some agent. Such logics with quan-
tifiers over information change find an application in epistemic protocol logics
[32, 15] that allow for protocol change or protocol declaration. For a different
approach to quantification over information change see [8], where a first-order
modal logic is used.
In this paper we introduce arbitrary arrow update logic (AAUL), which allows
quantification over arrow updates. Like the other quantified logics, we can use
AAUL to reason about knowability and security. Additionally, AAUL can be
used to reason about protocol and rule design, as we will show in Section 2.
We establish three kinds of results concerning AAUL. The first concerns
expressivity of the logic. We show that, under the usual assumptions that the
set of agents is finite and the set of propositional variables is infinite, arbitrary
public announcement logic and arbitrary arrow update logic are incomparable in
expressivity over the class of all Kripke models. We also identify a case where
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AAUL is more expressive than APAL. Finally, we compare arbitrary arrow
update logic to a number of other logics, and conclude that it is incomparable
to epistemic logic with common knowledge and that it is more expressive than
basic epistemic logic (and therefore also more expressive than arbitrary action
model logic and refinement modal logic [12]). Secondly, we show that the model
checking problem for AAUL is PSPACE-complete. Finally, we introduce a proof
system for AAUL, and prove it to be sound and complete with respect to our
set of intended models.
To argue for the relevance of AAUL for Artificial Intelligence in general and
knowledge representation in particular, it is helpful to also show why AUL is rel-
evant, and to keep in mind that AAUL is to AUL what APAL is to PAL. Where
in PAL, semantically (that is, on Kripke models), the object of study is the elim-
ination of states that do not satisfy a given specification (the announcement),
in APAL then the question is what kind of sets can be eliminated, and which
properties are invariant under arbitrary elimination. As pointed out above,
PAL and APAL are primarily studied in contexts where the states represent
epistemic information of agents, so PAL and APAL are pre-dominantly used
as formalisms to study dynamic epistemic phenomena, answering questions like
what kind of information can be learned (‘for which ϕ is [ϕ]aϕ true?’), and
what kind of information is knowable (‘for which ϕ is there an announcement ψ
such that [ψ]aϕ?’). But elimination of states is also relevant in other contexts
then epistemic ones, like for instance in deontic reasoning, where some states
may be (morally, or deontically) better than other states. In this context, the
PAL construct [ψ]ϕ would be interpreted as ‘if a law guaranteeing ψ would be
enforced, as a result, ϕ would be true’.
Where PAL and APAL focus on the elimination of specified or arbitrary
sets of states, respectively, the focus of attention of AUL and AAUL is on the
elimination of specified or arbitrary sets of transitions. For instance, where the
deontic interpretation of (A)PAL addresses ought-to-be norms (‘Sein Sollen’), a
deontic interpretation of (A)AUL is about ought-to-do norms (‘Tun Sollen’), see
e.g., the chapter ‘Deontic logic as I see it’, by the founder of deontic logic, von
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Wright, in [26] or [13] for a computer science perspective. So if the relations in
the Kripke model represent transitions, AUL can be used to reason about social
laws: is it the case that, by disallowing certain transitions, we can guarantee a
particular property? Norms can relate to rationality for instance, and indeed, in
AUL one can mimic backward induction in an extensive form game by requiring
that all moves for agent i should be kept which do not affect his chances of
winning the game. But then, under this perspective, AAUL is useful for the
Syntheses problem in social laws, and the mechanism design problem in game
theory, because it allows one to study questions like ‘is there a social law (in
the sense that only certain transitions are allowed) that guarantees a certain
outcome?’ Or, ‘is there a game (in the sense that only certain moves in the
extensive form of it are allowed) that only leaves a specified set of outcomes?’.
The application of AUL and AAUL to social laws and mechanism design in
further studied in [25, 23]. We return to the normative interpretation of arrow
updates in Section 2.2.
Arrow updates also have epistemic interpretations, which reinforces their
relevance for knowledge representation. As we will argue in Section 2.1, arrow
updates are more general than public announcements, since one can model semi-
private announcements. These are announcements where only a sub-group of
all the agents learn certain information, while all agents are aware what the
protocol is (like when all students in a class know that their teacher has sent
their marks to the administration office). This implies that AAUL provides
a formalism to reason about arbitrary semi-private announcements, making it
possible to express properties that are relevant for epistemic planning, like ‘there
is a private announcement, such that everybody in Ag1 knows what the password
to the system is, while everybody in Ag2 remains ignorant about this password’.
The application of (A)AUL to doxastic logic would have a similar taste as that
to epistemic logic. To give a simple example, removing a reflexive arrow in
doxastic logic would correspond to a situation where an agent’s belief are not
necessary correct any more.
More generally, in every AI-context where Kripke models are used to repre-
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sent information in a certain context, AUL and AAUL can be applied to reason
about a dynamic representation of that context, where certain transitions be-
tween certain states can be removed. If the binary relations represent agents
who can take moves, AUL enables us to reason about forbidding certain agents
to act in certain situations, wheres AAUL can represent information about what
can be achieved in principle, by restricting the moves that are available to the
agents. If the accessibility relation represents the flow of time, AAUL can formu-
late questions of what is guaranteed to hold if certain transitions will not occur.
The relation in a Kripke model could represent what the goals are of agents:
AAUL in this case would provide a formalism to reason about agents dropping
goals, which is considered to be an important aspect in agent programming
languages (see for instance the programming language GOAL [21, 1]). Like-
wise AUL and AAUL provide tools to reason about intention revision ([31]) and
hence, in principle for the dynamics of many agents’ attitudes, including Beliefs,
Desires and Intentions ([29]).
The arbitrary arrow update operator in AAUL adds implicit quantification
over arrow updates. Recently, [9] used the capacity in second order modal
logic to explicitly quantify over propositions. This makes it possible to define
arbitrary announcements within the object language: ∀p[p]ϕ. Additionally, this
also makes it possible to express properties like preservation (ϕ→ ∀p[p]ϕ) and
knowability (ϕ → ∃p〈p〉aϕ within the object language. It would of course be
interesting to do something similar for arrow updates. If we represent an arrow
update by U , the analogue of preservation would express a stability condition
of the environment, and, likewise, knowability could be studied with respect to
arrow updates. There would also interesting generalisations outside the scope
of epistemic logic that would become expressible, like for instance in agent
normative languages: Ought(ϕ)→ ∃U〈U〉[pi]ϕ (if ϕ ought to be the case, there
is a social law such that, when implemented, the agent’s program will achieve
(or maintain) it). However, as will become clear from the next sections, updates
U are not represented by a formula only, and hence quantifying over them in an
object language would require much more than embedding it in second-order
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modal logic. We leave studying such extensions of the object language for future
work.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We start with an informal
discussion of logics for arrow updates in Section 2. After that, in Section 3, we
define arbitrary arrow update logic as well as the logics we want to compare
AAUL to. Then, in Section 4 we prove a number of expressivity results related
to AAUL. In Section 5 we show that the model checking problem for AAUL is
PSPACE-complete. Finally, in Section 6 we provide a proof system for AAUL,
and we show that it is sound and complete.
2. The Different Meanings of Arrow Updates
Public announcements and arrow updates were originally introduced as types
of dynamic epistemic logic. As such, they were intended to be interpreted as
so-called “epistemic events,” which change the information state of one or more
agents. But there are other interpretations of these operators that seem equally
useful. We briefly discussed several of these interpretations in the Introduction.
Here, we discuss two interpretations in more detail: the epistemic interpretation
and the normative interpretation.1 interpretation.
2.1. The Epistemic Interpretation
Consider the following situation: Alice and Bob are playing a simple card
game. There are only two cards in play, the king of spades and the ace of spades.
Both players are dealt one card, face down, so neither player knows which card
they (or the other player) have been dealt. There are two possibilities: Alice has
the king, which we denote by p, or Alice has the ace, which we denote by ¬p.
Suppose that Alice has in fact been dealt the king, although neither Alice nor
Bob knows this. We are interested in the information state of the two agents,
which is usually represented as a Kripke model such as the model MEp shown
1Note that we call it the “normative interpretation” because we use the logics to reason
about norms. We do not wish to take a position in the normative vs. descriptive debate.
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Figure 1: A simple epistemic model MEp .
in Figure 1. In this interpretation, arrows between worlds are used to represent
the uncertainty of agents. There is an arrow labeled a from w to w′ if and only if
in world w agent a is uncertain about the state of the world and thinks it might
be w′ instead of w. In such a case we say that w′ is epistemically accessible from
w for a. We say that a knows in w that ϕ if and only if ϕ is true in every world
w′ that is epistemically accessible for a.
Note that MEp is an accurate representation of the simple card game. The
case where Alice has the king is represented as world w1 and the case where
Alice has the ace is represented as world w2. Regardless of who has which card,
neither agent knows what card they have, so they consider both cases possible.
But the agents do posses knowledge: in w1 for instance, Alice knows that Bob
does not know that Alice holds the king, written MEp , w1 |= a¬bp. In our
example Alice holds the king, so w1 is the actual state of the world while w2 is
an alternative that the agents consider possible.
In this setting, a public announcement represents any event that is publicly
observed and that provides agents with more information. In particular, because
it is publicly observed, all agents receive the same information. An example of
a public announcement is a literal announcement that is made in public by a
trusted source. Claire could walk in, look at both cards and state that “Alice
has the king.” But there are also other events that, while not literally being
announcements, have the same effect. For example, Alice could turn her card,
and place it face up on the table. Note that when Alice does this, all agents
receive the same information: they learn that p is true.
In the model, the effect of a public announcement is quite simple: if ϕ is
announced then all worlds that do not satisfy ϕ are removed, as well as all
arrows that point to such worlds. In the example, if Alice turns her card face
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Figure 2: The updated model MEp ∗ p.
up the model MEp is changed to the model MEp ∗p, which is shown in Figure 2.
In this updated model only one world remains. In this world p holds, so both
agents know that p. This makes sense: Alice just turned her card face up so
obviously both agents now know that she has the king. We denote this by
MEp , w1 |= [p](ap ∧ bp), which can be read as “after p is announced, a and
b know that p.”
A formula ϕ holds after an arbitrary public announcement, written [!]ϕ, if
for every ψ, we have [ψ]ϕ. The dual, 〈!〉ϕ, denotes that for some ψ, it holds
that [ψ]ϕ. In our example, we have for instance that after all announcements
Bob considers it possible that Alice has the king of spades, and there is no
announcement after which Alice learns her card while Bob does not:
MEp , w1 |= [!]¬b¬p ∧ ¬〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bp) (1)
Public announcements are very useful for modeling events that are observed
by all agents. But they cannot model more complicated events. For these more
complicated events we could instead turn to the extremely powerful action mod-
els [7]. Unfortunately, the great power of action models comes with a significant
cost: the model checking problem for public announcement logic can be solved
in polynomial time [11][Lemma 29], whereas the model checking problem for a
logic with event models is PSPACE-complete [4].2 Additionally, the increased
power of action models requires a more complicated syntax, making them harder
for humans to read and understand. Arrow updates fit in between: they are
capable of modeling more events than public announcements—if not as many
2The satisfiability problem for action models is also more expensive than that of public
announcements, taking NEXPTIME as opposed to PSPACE [4].
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as action models—but their model checking problem can still be solved in poly-
nomial time, as shown in [25]. Switching from public announcements to arrow
updates does, however, still come with some cost: arrow updates are harder for
humans to read and understand than public announcements, even though they
are still easier to read than action models.
The kind of events that can be modeled by arrow updates are sometimes
referred to as semi-private announcements. Like public announcements, semi-
private announcements are events where agents learn new information. But
unlike public announcements, this new information need not become available
to all agents. However, while the new information can be private, the procedure
or protocol through which the agents gain information is publicly known. It is
this combination of private information and a public protocol that gives semi-
private announcements their name.
Returning to our card scenario, suppose that instead of turning her card face
up, Alice openly looks at her card without showing it to Bob. By doing this,
Alice learns that she holds the king. Her action cannot be modeled as a public
announcement, because the new information is not given to all agents. It can,
however, be modeled as a semi-private announcement: Alice looking at her card
can be seen as a run of the protocol “if Alice holds the king then she learns
she has the king, if Alice holds the ace she learns that she has the ace.” Bob
does not learn that Alice holds the king, but he does know that the protocol
has been executed. We can represent this semi-private announcement as the
arrow update UEp := (p, a, p), (¬p, a,¬p), (>, b,>). The triples in the arrow
update are called clauses. A clause has the form (source, agent, target), and
can be interpreted as “if source holds then agent learns that target holds.”3 Or
perhaps it might be better to say that the agent learns that the target used to
hold, as in some cases the very fact that the agent learns the truth of the target
3For technical reasons we allow multiple clauses with the same source and agent but dif-
ferent target. Such clauses can be read disjunctively. For example, (p, a,bp), (p, a,ap) can
be read as (p, a,bp ∨ ap).
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can make it false. For example, if a learns that the Moore sentence p ∧ ¬ap
holds, then p ∧ ¬ap becomes false.
Remark 1. There is another, more technical, difference between public an-
nouncements and arrow updates that is worth mentioning. Public announce-
ments are usually assumed to be truthful. There is no such assumption for arrow
updates. While the information contained in an arrow update can, of course,
be truthful, there is no technical restriction on arrow updates that guarantees
truthfulness. So arrow updates can be used to model events that, accidentally
or by design, convey incorrect information to an agent.
Knowledge is, traditionally, assumed to be truthful. It might therefore be
slightly more accurate to say that we are modeling the effect that events have
on the agent’s beliefs, rather than their knowledge.
Recall that in order to apply a public announcement [ϕ] in a Kripke model
we removed all worlds that did not satisfy ϕ. In order to apply an arrow
update we do something similar: an arrow (w1, w2) ∈ R(a) satisfies a clause
(ϕ1, b, ϕ2) if and only if w1 satisfies ϕ1, a = b and w2 satisfies ϕ2. When
applying an arrow update we remove all arrows that do not satisfy any of the
clauses in the update.4 Let us return to our example. If we apply the update
UEp = (p, a, p), (¬p, a,¬p), (>, b,>) to the model MEp we obtain the model
shown in Figure 3. All arrows for b are retained, because they satisfy (>, b,>).
The arrow for a from w1 to itself satisfies (p, a, p) and the arrow for a from w2
to itself satisfies (¬p, a,¬p), so both are retained. The arrows for a between
w1 and w2 satisfy none of the clauses, so they are removed. Note that in
MEp ∗ UEp Alice knows which card she holds and Bob knows that Alice knows
this, but Bob does not know which card Alice holds. This is exactly as it
should be, since Alice looked at her card openly but without showing it to Bob.
Similar to public announcements, we use MEp , w1 |= [UEp ]ψ to denote “after
4In order to emphasize the similarities between public announcements and arrow updates
we specify the arrows that are to be retained. We could, alternatively, specify the arrows that
are to be removed. The two types of specification are inter-definable.
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Figure 3: The updated model MEp ∗ UEp.
UEp has happened, ψ holds.” In our particular example, we have for instance
MEp , w1 |= [UEp ](ap ∧ ¬bp).
It should now be clear how the quantified construct [l]ϕ reads, namely that
ϕ holds for every arrow update U .5 We use 〈l〉 as a dual of [l], so 〈l〉ϕ holds
if and only if there is some U such that [U ]ϕ. In the epistemic interpretation,
〈l〉ϕ means “there is some semi-private announcement U that will make ϕ true.”
A typical example is 〈l〉(ap ∧ ¬bp), which can be read as “it is possible to
semi-privately inform a that p is true, without informing b.” Indeed, for our
example we have:
MEp , w1 |= 〈l〉b¬p ∧ 〈l〉(ap ∧ ¬bp) (2)
The reader should compare (1) with (2). With public announcements and ar-
bitrary public announcements, we can only remove access to a world for all
agents at the same time, by removing the world entirely. Using arrow updates
and arbitrary arrow updates, we can more subtly just remove access between
two worlds for some agents, while leaving it intact for others. In words: us-
ing announcements in MEp , the two agents that start out knowing the same
will always know the same, while using arrow updates, it is possible to reach a
situation in which the two agents have different knowledge.
2.2. The Normative Interpretation
In the normative interpretation, we interpret arrows not as uncertainty but
as the agents’ ability to act; There is an a-arrow from w1 to w2 if and only if
in w1 there is some action agent a can take that would change the state of the
5There is a technical complication here, related to circularity. See Section 3 for details.
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Figure 4: The model MNo .
world from w1 to w2. So we have aϕ if and only if ϕ will be true after every
(single) action by a. Let us consider an example. Alice an Bob are together
in the office, working late. Both need to use the printer, but printer time is a
limited resource: there is only enough time to print two files. At each point in
time, either Alice has control of the printer (p) or Bob has control (¬p). The
person in control of the printer can choose to print their own file, or they can
print the other agent’s file. If they print the other’s file, then by doing so they
also transfer control. If Alice has finished printing her file we represent this
by fa, and if Bob has finished printing his file we represent that by fb. This
situation can be represented by the model MNo shown in Figure 4.
In this example, like in most other situations, some of the available actions
are more desirable than others. Ideally, both agents get the opportunity to print
their files, so in w2 Alice should not keep control of the printer to herself, and in
w3 Bob should not keep control to himself. The division of actions into “good”
actions and “bad” actions can be referred to as a norm.6
6In the example, we considered a norm of fairness or perhaps morality, but we could also
have considered a norm of legality, rationality or etiquette. Even an arbitrary set of actions
can become a norm if the agents involved agree to abide by it.
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Figure 5: The updated model MNo ∗ UNo .
In the normative interpretation, arrows in a Kripke model represent ac-
tions. Arrow updates allow us to specify a subset of the arrows, which we
can interpret as those actions that are allowed. Returning to our example,
the norm that agents should not keep the printer to themselves if they have
finished printing their file can be represented by the arrow update UNo :=
(¬fa, a,>), (fa, a, fb), (¬fb, b,>), (fb, b, fa).7 If we apply UNo to MNo we get
the model shown in Figure 5. In the updated model we only consider those
actions that are not only possible but also allowed. Writing ϕ for aϕ∧bϕ,
we have MNo ∗ UNo , w1 |= (fa ∧ fb), which is equivalent to MNo , w1 |=
[UNo](fa ∧ fb). The latter can be read as “if everyone obeys the norm UNo
then in two times steps fa ∧ fb is guaranteed to hold.” Readers familiar with
the literature on Normative Systems may also note that the normative inter-
pretation of arrow updates is in some ways very similar to Normative Temporal
Logic, see for example [3].
In the normative interpretation, [U ]ϕ means “if everyone obeys the norm U ,
then ϕ will hold.” As such, 〈l〉ϕ means “there is some norm/rule/protocol/law
7Note that UNo can be read as “if your file isn’t printed yet, do whatever you want. If
your file is printed, make sure the other file gets printed.”
13
that, if obeyed, will guarantee the truth of ϕ.” Returning to the example
given above, 〈l〉(fa ∧ fb) means “there is some rule that, if followed, would
guarantee that both files get printed. We saw that [UNo ](fa ∧ fb) holds in
MNo , w1, so 〈l〉(fa ∧ fb) holds there as well.
Remark 2. Recall that, in the epistemic interpretation, arrow updates are not
necessarily truthful. Semantically, this means that there is no guarantee that
an arrow from a state to itself will be retained. In the normative interpretation,
this property means that a norm U does not necessarily allow agents to remain
in the same state—i.e. to do nothing. So arrow updates can be used to formalize
norms that require agents to take action.
In sum, using logics for arrow updates, one can reason about the result of
removing certain transitions from a model. This can be used to reason about
ethics, rationality or planning. One interesting line of research (that we will not
pursue further in this paper, but see [24] for some preliminary results), would
be to enhance the capability of AAUL to reason about planning by adding more
temporal operators. For example, we could use the CTL operators AG (“on ev-
ery path, at all times in the future”) and AF (“on every path, at some time in
the future”) to represent properties like liveness, fairness and safety in concur-
rent processes (see for instance [30]). Let good represent some kind of desirable
state, bad an undesirable state, eni the fact that agent i is enabled and ex i the
fact that agent i is allowed to execute. Then we can define live := AG AF good ,
fair :=
∧
i(AG AF eni → AG AF (eni ∧ ex i)) and safe := AG ¬bad . The for-
mula [U ](live ∧ fair ∧ safe) then means “the protocol U guarantees liveness,
fairness and safety.” As such, 〈l〉(live∧ fair ∧ safe) expresses that there is a way
to constrain the overall system such that the desirable properties hold.
3. Language and semantics
In this paper we compare AAUL to a number of other logics. For the sake
of brevity we only give full definitions for some of these logics. In addition to
AAUL we give definitions for arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL), the
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fragments arrow update logic (AUL) and public announcement logic (PAL) of
AAUL and APAL respectively and a basic epistemic logic (EL). For definitions
of the other logics we refer to publications that do give a complete definition.
This still leaves us with five logics to define. The most convenient way to
do this is to consider them as fragments of one larger logic. This logic is a
combination of APAL and AAUL, so we refer to it as APAUL. Let A be a
nonempty finite set of agents and P a countably infinite set of propositional
variables.
Definition 1 (Languages). The language L(A,P ) of APAUL consists of all
formulas and updates given by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | aϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | [U ]ϕ | [!]ϕ | [l]ϕ
U ::= (ϕ, a, ϕ) | (ϕ, a, ϕ), U
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. We write L for L(A,P ) where this should not cause
confusion.
The language LEL of epistemic logic is the fragment of L that does not
contain the operators [ϕ], [U ], [!] and [l]. The language LPAL of public an-
nouncement logic is the fragment of L that does not contain the operators [U ],
[!] and [l]. The language LAPAL of arbitrary public announcement logic is the
fragment of L that does not contain the operators [U ] and [l]. The language
LAUL of arrow update logic is the fragment of L that does not contain the op-
erators [ϕ], [!] and [l]. The language LAAUL of arbitrary arrow update logic is
the fragment of L that does not contain the operators [ϕ] and [!].
We use ∨,→,↔,>,⊥,∧ and ∨ in the usual way as abbreviations, and we
abuse notation slightly by identifying the list U = (ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · , (ϕn, an, ψn)
with the set U = {(ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · , (ϕn, an, ψn)}. Furthermore, we use ♦a, 〈ϕ〉,
〈U〉, 〈!〉 and 〈l〉 as abbreviations for ¬a¬, ¬[ϕ]¬, ¬[U ]¬, ¬[!]¬ and ¬[l]¬.
Finally, if B = {a1, · · · , an} we write (ϕ,B, ψ) for (ϕ, a1, ψ), · · · , (ϕ, an, ψ).
These languages are all interpreted on Kripke models.
Definition 2. A Kripke model M is a triple (W,R, V ) where
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• W 6= ∅ is a set of worlds,
• R : A→ ℘(W ×W ) assigns an accessibility relation to each a ∈ A and
• V : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation.
A Kripke model M = (W,R, V ) is an S5 model if R(a) is an equivalence relation
for all a ∈ A.
We can now define the semantics of APAUL. The other logics simply inherit
their semantics from APAUL.
Definition 3. Let M = (W,R, V ) be a Kripke model and let w ∈ W . The
satisfaction relation |= is given inductively as follows.
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= aϕ iff M, v |= ϕ for each v such that (w, v) ∈ R(a)
M,w, |= [ψ]ϕ iff M,w 6|= ψ or (M ∗ ψ), w |= ϕ
M,w |= [U ]ϕ iff (M ∗ U), w |= ϕ
M,w |= [!]ϕ iff M,w |= [ψ]ϕ for each ψ ∈ LPAL
M,w |= [l]ϕ iff M,w |= [U ]ϕ for each U ∈ LAUL
where (M ∗ ψ) and (M ∗ U) are given by:
M ∗ ψ = (Wψ, Rψ, V ψ)
Wψ = {w ∈W |M,w |= ψ}
Rψ(a) = R(a) ∩ (Wψ ×Wψ)
V ψ(p) = V (p) ∩Wψ
M ∗ U = (W,RU , V )
RU (a) = {(v, v′) ∈ R(a) | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U :
(M,v |= ϕ and M,v′ |= ϕ′)}
A formula ϕ is true on M, denoted M |= ϕ, if M,w |= ϕ for all w ∈ W . A
formula ϕ is valid, denoted |= ϕ, if M |= ϕ for every Kripke model M . A
formula ϕ is valid on S5, denoted |=S5 ϕ, if M |= ϕ for every S5 model M .
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Remark 3. Note that the arbitrary public announcement operator [!] quantifies
only over ψ ∈ LPAL. So the formulas that [!] quantifies over do not themselves
contain [!] (or [l], for that matter). Likewise, [l] only quantifies over arrow
updates U that do not contain [l] and [!]. Restricting [!] and [l] in this way is
necessary in order to avoid circularity.
The price we pay for solving the circularity problem this way is that [!] and
[l] do not quite have the informal meaning we would like to associate with them.
We would like [!]ϕ to mean “for every announcement [ψ], we have [ψ]ϕ.” And
when we say every announcement, that includes those announcements [ψ] where
ψ contains [!]. But, as shown in [24], there are ϕ and ([!]-containing) ψ such
that 6|= [!]ϕ → [ψ]ϕ. So [!] does not quite have the desired informal meaning.
A similar proof for [l] does not yet exist, but we believe that the U and ϕ
containing [l] can be constructed such that 6|= [l]ϕ→ [U ]ϕ.
Remark 4. Unlike public announcements, arrow updates do not preserve S5:
updating an S5 model M with an arrow update U may result in a non-S5 model
M ∗ U .8 We can, of course, evaluate AAUL on S5 models. We just have to
keep in mind that it is possible that, during the evaluation of a formula, we may
move from an S5 model to a non-S5 model. As a result, necessitation fails for
[U ] on S5. For example, we have |=S5 aϕ→ ϕ but 6|=S5 [U ](aϕ→ ϕ).
Necessitation for [U ] does still hold on the class of all Kripke models: if |= ψ
then |= [U ]ψ. It therefore seems fair to say that the class of all Kripke models
is the “natural habitat” of arrow updates.
The main reason why arrow updates do not preserve S5 is that, as discussed
above, they are not guaranteed to be truthful.
Now that we have defined the semantics of AAUL, let us consider a few
equivalences that will be useful later.
Lemma 1. For every pointed model M,w, every p ∈ P , every a ∈ A and every
8The same holds for other commonly used subclasses of the class of all Kripke models, such
as S4 and KD45.
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ϕ,ψ, U, U ′ ∈ LAAUL we have
M,w |= [U ]p ⇔ M,w |= p
M,w |= [U ]¬ϕ ⇔ M,w |= ¬[U ]ϕ
M,w |= [U ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ M,w |= [U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ
M,w |= [U ]aϕ ⇔ M,w |=
∧
(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → a(χ→ [U ]ϕ))
M,w |= [U ][U ′]ϕ ⇔ M,w |= [U × U ′]ϕ
where U × U ′ = {(ψ1 ∧ [U ]ψ2, a, χ1 ∧ [U ]χ2) | (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈ U, (ψ2, a, χ2) ∈ U ′}.
Proof. The first three statements are easy to prove. Arrow updates do not
change the valuation of a model, so M,w |= [U ]p if and only if M,w |= p.
Arrow updates commute with negation because M,w |= [U ]¬ϕ⇔ (M ∗U), w |=
¬ϕ ⇔ (M ∗ U), w 6|= ϕ ⇔ M,w 6|= [U ]ϕ ⇔ M,w |= ¬[U ]ϕ. Arrow updates
distribute over conjunctions because M,w |= [U ](ϕ∧ψ)⇔ (M∗U), w |= ϕ∧ψ ⇔
(M ∗ U), w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ ⇔ M,w |= [U ]ϕ and M,w |= [U ]ψ ⇔ M,w |=
[U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ.
The last two statements require slightly more work to prove. We have
M,w |= [U ]aϕ⇔ (M ∗U), w |= aϕ⇔ (M ∗U), w′ |= ϕ for all w′ that are a-
accessible from w′ inM∗U . Note that we have (M∗U), w′ |= ϕ⇔M,w′ |= [U ]ϕ.
So M,w |= [U ]aϕ ⇔ M,w′ |= [U ]ϕ for all w′ that are a-accessible from w in
M ∗ U . The trick is now to determine which worlds w′ are a-accessible from
w in M ∗ U , so for which w′ we must have M,w′ |= [U ]ϕ in order to have
M,w |= [U ]aϕ.
Consider any clause (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U . If M,w |= ψ then every a-successor w′ of
w that satisfies χ is an a-successor of w in M ∗ U . The formula [U ]ϕ holds in
all these worlds if and only if M,w |= ψ → a(χ → [U ]ϕ). We then only have
to repeat this for every (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U : we have M,w |= [U ]aϕ if and only if
M,w |= ∧(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → a(χ→ [U ]ϕ)).
Finally, in order to determine when we have M,w |= [U ][U ′]ϕ we must
determine which arrows are retained if we apply [U ] and [U ′] after each other.
An arrow is retained by the first update [U ] if and only if it satisfies some
clause (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈ U . In order for this arrow to be retained by U ′ as well,
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it must additionally satisfy some clause (ψ2, a, χ2). But it must satisfy this
(ψ2, a, χ2) not in M but in M ∗ U . Such an arrow must therefore start in a
ψ1∧[U ]ψ2 world, and go to a χ1∧[U ]χ2 world. In that case it satisfies the clause
(ψ1∧[U ]ψ2, a, χ1∧[U ]χ2). We have such a combined clause for every (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈
U and every (ψ2, a, χ2) ∈ U ′, so M,w |= [U ][U ′]ϕ ⇔ M,w |= [U × U ′]ϕ where
U × U ′ = {(ψ1 ∧ [U ]ψ2, a, χ1 ∧ [U ]χ2) | (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈ U, (ψ2, a, χ2) ∈ U ′}.
In later sections we will also use the notions of bisimulation and bisimulation
contraction. The following definitions are as usual.
Definition 4. Let M1 = (W1, R1, V1) and M2 = (W2, R2, V2) be models and
let B be a relation on W1 ×W2. The relation B is a bisimulation on M1 and
M2 if for all (w1, w2) ∈ B, we have
• for every p ∈ P , w1 ∈ V1(p)⇔ w2 ∈ V2(p),
• for every a ∈ A and every w′1 ∈ W1 such that (w1, w′1) ∈ R1, there is a
w′2 ∈W2 such that (w2, w′2) ∈ R2 and (w′1, w′2) ∈ B and
• for every a ∈ A and every w′2 ∈ W2 such that (w2, w′2) ∈ R2, there is a
w′1 ∈W1 such that (w1, w′1) ∈ R2 and (w′1, w′2) ∈ B.
Two states w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2 are bisimilar, denoted w1 ∼M1,M2 w2, if
there is a bisimulation B on M1 and M2 such that (w1, w2) ∈ B.
We omit mentioning the models where this should not cause confusion, and
write w1 ∼ w2 if the states are bisimilar. The following is a standard result, see
any textbook or handbook on modal logic for details.
Lemma 2. Let M1 = (W1, R1, V1) and M2 = (W2, R2, V2) be models. The
relation ∼⊆W1×W2 is an equivalence relation, and it is a bisimulation on M1
and M2. Furthermore, ∼ is the largest bisimulation on M1 and M2.
Definition 5. Let M = (W,R, V ) be a model. The bisimulation contraction of
M is the model MBC = (WBC , RBC , VBC) given by
• WBC := {[w] | w ∈W}, where [w] := {w′ ∈W | w ∼ w′},
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• for every a ∈ A, RBC(a) = {([w], [w′]) | (w,w′) ∈ R(a)} and
• for every p ∈ P , VBC(p) = {[w] | w ∈ V (p)}.
It as another standard result that, for every w ∈W , we have M,w ∼M,MBC
MBC , [w]. Furthermore, using the Paige-Tarjan algorithm
9 [27], we can compute
MBC in polynomial time and linear space.
The relevance of bisimulation is that well-behaved modal logics tend to be
invariant under bisimulation, i.e. if w1 ∼ w2 then any formula φ that holds in
one of the states also hold in the other. AAUL is no exception.
Lemma 3. For every φ ∈ LAAUL and every M1, w1 and M2, w2 such that
w1 ∼ w2, we have M1, w1 |= φ if and only if M2, w2 |= φ.
Proof. We first show that AUL is invariant under bisimulation. The proof is
by induction on the construction of φ. The first clause of the definition of
bisimilarity guarantees that w1 and w2 satisfy the same propositional variables.
So if φ is atomic, we have M1, w1 |= φ ⇔ M2, w2 |= φ. Suppose then as
induction hypothesis that φ is not atomic and that the lemma holds for all
strict subformulas of φ.
We continue by case distinction on the main connective of φ. Most of the
cases are as usual, so we do not discuss them in detail. The one relatively
interesting case is φ = [U ]φ′.
We first show that ∼M1,M2 is also a bisimulation relation on M1 ∗ U and
M2 ∗ U . Take any w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2 such that w1 ∼M1,M2 w2. The
valuations of M1∗U and M2∗U are identical to that of M1 and M2, respectively,
so w1 and w2 agree on propositional variables. Furthermore, take any a ∈ A and
any w′1 such that (w1, w
′
1) ∈ RU1 (a). Then, in particular, (w1, w′1) ∈ R1(a). Since
∼M1,M2 is a bisimulation, there is a (w2, w′2) ∈ R1(a) such that w′1 ∼M1,M2 w′2.
The arrow from w1 to w
′
1 is retained by the update U , so there is some
clause (ψ, a, ψ′) ∈ U such that M1, w1 |= ψ and M1, w′1 |= ψ′. By the induction
9Technically, the algorithm described in [27] applies to single agent models only, but ex-
tending it to the multi-agent context is trivial.
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hypothesis, and the facts that w1 ∼M1,M2 w2 and w′1 ∼M1,M2 w′2, it follows
that M2, w2 |= ψ and M2, w′2 |= ψ′. So the arrow from w2 to w′2 matches
the clause (ψ, a, ψ′) is retained by U . It follows that (w2, w′2) ∈ RU2 (a) and
(w′1, w
′
2) ∈∼M1,M2 .
By similar reasoning, for every w′2 such that (w2, w
′
2) ∈ R2 ∗ U(a) there is
some w′1 such that (w1, w
′
1) ∈ R1 ∗ U(a) and w′1 ∼M1,M2 w′2. So ∼M1,M2 is a
bisimulation not only on M1 and M2, but also on M1 ∗ U and M2 ∗ U . By the
induction hypothesis it follows thatM1∗U,w1 |= φ′ if and only ifM2∗U,w2 |= φ′,
and therefore M1, w1 |= [U ]φ′ if and only if M2, w2 |= [U ]φ′, which was to be
shown.
Now that we have shown that AUL is invariant under bisimulation, we can
show that AAUL is also invariant under bisimulation. The proof is again by
induction and by case distinction on the main connective. The only new case is
φ = [l]φ′, so we omit the other cases.
Let w1 ∼ w2. For every U ∈ LAUL, we have M1, w1 |= [U ]φ′ if and only
if M2, w2 |= [U ]φ′. It follows immediately that M1, w1 |= [l]φ′ if and only if
M2, w2 |= [l]φ′.
So bisimilar states are indistinguishable. In general it is not the case that
every two non-bisimilar states are distinguishable, but for finite models it is the
case.
Lemma 4. Let M1 = (W1, R1, V1) and M2 = (W2, R2, V2) be finite models. For
any w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2 such that w1 6∼ w2, there is a φ ∈ LAUL such that
M1, w1 |= φ and M2, w2 6|= φ.
It is a standard result that the above lemma holds for basic modal logic
(which we referred to as EL here). Since LEL ⊆ LAUL it follows immediately
that the lemma holds for AUL as well.
4. Expressivity
In this section we investigate the expressive power of the newly defined
arbitrary arrow update logic relative to arbitrary public announcement logic
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and a number of other well-known logics in (dynamic) epistemic logic.
Definition 6 (Expressivity). Let two logical languages L1 and L2 and a class
of structures C be given. If for every formula ϕ ∈ L1 there is a ψ ∈ L2 such
that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on C, we say that L2 is at least as expressive as
L1 on C, notation: L1 C L2 (and L1 6C L2 if this is not the case). If the
converse also holds, L1 and L2 are equally expressive on C, notation L1 ≡C L2.
If the converse does not hold, L2 is strictly more expressive than L1, notation
L1 ≺C L2. When both L1 6C L2 and L2 6C L1 then L1 and L2 are expressively
incomparable on C, notation: L1 ‖C L2. We omit the subscript C if C is the
class of all Kripke models.
4.1. APAL and AAUL are incomparable in expressivity
In this subsection we prove that LAPAL ‖ LAAUL. This proof will be sig-
nificantly easier to understand if we first describe the general structure of the
proof, without considering most of the technical details.
Let Upd! and let Updl be the set of updates quantified over by 〈!〉 and
〈l〉 respectively.10 Now take any ψ ∈ Upd!. PAL and AUL are both equally
expressive as EL [7, 22], so in particular PAL and AUL are equally expressive
as each other. As such, there is a formula ψ′ ∈ LAUL that is equivalent to ψ.
Let Uψ := (>, A, ψ′), and note that Uψ ∈ Updl. The public announcement
〈ψ〉 removes all worlds that do not satisfy ψ. The arrow update 〈Uψ〉 does not
remove any worlds, but does eliminate all arrows to worlds that do not satisfy
ψ′ (which is equivalent to ψ). Inaccessible worlds might as well not exist, so
removing all arrows to a world has essentially the same effect as removing the
world entirely: whenever (M ∗ ψ), w exists11, it is bisimilar to (M ∗ Uψ), w.
On the other hand, for some U ∈ Updl and M,w there is no ψ ∈ Upd! that
makes (M ∗U), w and (M ∗ψ), w bisimilar.12 If we abuse notation by identifying
10So Upd! = LPAL and Updl = {U ∈ LAUL | U is an arrow update}.
11If M,w 6|= ψ then w is removed by 〈ψ〉, so (M ∗ ψ), w doesn’t exist.
12This follows from the fact that public announcements preserve S5, but arrow updates do
not necessarily do so.
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ψ with Uψ, we therefore have Upd! ⊂ Updl. In other words, 〈l〉 quantifies over
a strictly larger set than 〈!〉. Crucially, this quantification is “all or nothing”;
in AAUL we can quantify over Updl, by using 〈l〉, but not over the smaller
set Upd!. For suitably chosen ϕ we would expect to find three kinds of pointed
models:
1. models M1, w such that M1, w 6|= 〈X〉ϕ for all X ∈ Updl,
2. models M2, w such that M2, w 6|= 〈X〉ϕ for all X ∈ Upd! but M2, w |=
〈X〉ϕ for some X ∈ Updl,
3. models M3, w such that M3, w |= 〈X〉ϕ for some X ∈ Upd!.
The AAUL formula 〈l〉ϕ distinguishes between M1, w and M2, w, but not be-
tweenM2, w andM3, w. The APAL formula 〈!〉ϕ on the other hand distinguishes
between M2, w and M3, w, but not between M1, w and M2, w. At this point
we cannot guarantee that there is no ψ1 ∈ LAAUL that distinguishes between
M2, w and M3, w, or that there is no ψ2 ∈ LAPAL that distinguishes between
M1, w and M2, w. But, because AAUL cannot quantify over Upd! and APAL
cannot quantify over Updl, there is no reason to assume that such ψ1 and/or
ψ2 exist. As such, we would expect there to be no APAL formula equivalent to
〈l〉ϕ (which implies that LAAUL 6 LAPAL) and no AAUL formula equivalent
to 〈!〉ϕ (which implies that LAPAL 6 LAAUL).
The method we use to show that LAPAL ‖ LAAUL is inspired by the consid-
erations described above, but with one difference. Instead of three models M1,
M2 and M3, we use three sets {Mx1 | x ∈ P \ {p}}, {Mx2 | x ∈ P \ {p}} and
{Mx3 | x ∈ P \ {p}}.
Definition 7. For x ∈ P \ {p} the model Mx1 = (W1, R1, V x1 ) is given by
• W1 = {w1, w2},
• R1(a) = {(w1, w2)} ∪ {(w1, w1)},
• R1(b) = ∅ for all b 6= a,
• V x1 (p) = {w1},
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• V x1 (q) = ∅ for all q 6= p.
The model Mx1 is shown in Figure 6. We use w3 as an alias for w1 and w4 as
an alias for w2 in M
x
1 , so M
x
1 , w3 = M
x
1 , w1 and M
x
1 , w4 = M
x
1 , w2.
Definition 8. For x ∈ P \ {p}, the model Mx2 = (W2, R2, V x2 ) is given by
• W2 = {w1, w2, w3},
• R1(a) = {(w1, w2), (w3, w2), (w1, w3), (w3, w1)} ∪ {(w1, w1), (w3, w3)},
• R1(b) = ∅ for all b 6= a,
• V x2 (p) = {w1, w3},
• V x2 (x) = {w3},
• V x2 (q) = ∅ for all q 6∈ {p, x}.
The model Mx2 is shown in Figure 7. We use w4 as an alias for w2 in M
x
2 , so
Mx2 , w4 = M
x
2 , w2.
Definition 9. For x ∈ P \ {p}, the model Mx3 = (W3, R3, V x3 ) is given by
• W3 = {w1, w2, w3, w4},
• R1(a) = {(w1, w2), (w3, w4), (w1, w3), (w3, w1)} ∪ {(w1, w1), (w3, w3)},
• R1(b) = ∅ for all b 6= a,
• V x3 (p) = {w1, w3},
• V x3 (x) = {w3, w4},
• V x3 (q) = ∅ for all q 6∈ {p, x}.
The model Mx3 is shown in Figure 8
The reason for using w3 as an alias for w1 and w4 as an alias for w2 is that
it allows us to succinctly point out the similarities between the models; there
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Figure 6: The model Mx1 .
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Figure 7: The model Mx2 .
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Figure 8: The model Mx3 .
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is an arrow from wi to wj (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) in one of the models if and only if
there is such an arrow in the other models.
Let φ1 := ap ∧ ♦a¬ap. We first show that Mx1 , w1 6|= 〈l〉φ1, Mx2 , w1 |=
〈l〉φ1, Mx2 , w1 6|= 〈!〉φ1 and Mx3 , w1 |= 〈!〉φ1 for all x ∈ P \ {p}. After that,
we show that there is no APAL formula that distinguishes between Mx1 , w1 and
Mx2 , w1 for all x ∈ P \{p}, and that there is no AAUL formula that distinguishes
between Mx2 , w1 and M
x
3 , w1 for all x ∈ P \{p}. This suffices to show that there
is no APAL formula equivalent to 〈l〉φ1 and no AAUL formula equivalent to
〈!〉φ1, which implies that LAPAL ‖ LAAUL.
Lemma 5. For every x ∈ P \ {p} we have Mx1 , w1 6|= 〈l〉φ1, Mx2 , w1 |= 〈l〉φ1,
Mx2 , w1 6|= 〈!〉φ1 and Mx3 , w1 |= 〈!〉φ1.
Proof. Recall that φ1 = ap ∧ ♦a¬ap. Let Ux := (p, a, p), (x ∨ ¬p, a,>) and
ψx := p ∨ x. Then Mx2 ∗ Ux and Mx3 ∗ ψx are as shown in Figure 9. We have
(Mx2 ∗ Ux), w1 |= φ1 and (Mx3 ∗ ψx), w1 |= φ1, which implies that Mx2 , w1 |=
〈Ux〉φ1 and Mx3 , w1 |= 〈ψx〉φ1. Because Ux ∈ LAUL and ψx ∈ LPAL this, in
turn, implies that Mx2 , w1 |= 〈l〉φ1 and Mx3 , w1 |= 〈!〉φ1.
Left to show is that Mx1 , w1 6|= 〈l〉φ1 and Mx2 , w1 6|= 〈!〉φ1. In order for any
pointed model to satisfy φ1 there must be at least two p-worlds in the model:
one that satisfies ap and one that satisfies ¬ap. The model Mx1 has only one
p-world and arrow updates cannot add worlds. So for every arrow update U we
have Mx1 , w1 6|= 〈U〉φ1. This implies that Mx1 , w1 6|= 〈l〉φ1.
Now suppose towards a contradiction that there is some ψ ∈ LPAL such
that Mx2 , w1 |= 〈ψ〉φ1. In order for φ1 to hold in (Mx2 ∗ ψ), w1 there must be
at least two p-worlds in Mx2 ∗ ψ. This means that both w1 and w3 must be
retained by the update 〈ψ〉. Furthermore, w3 must satisfy ¬ap so w2 must
also be retained. But then (Mx2 ∗ ψ), w1 6|= ap, contradicting the assumption
that Mx2 , w1 |= 〈ψ〉φ1. We therefore have Mx2 , w1 6|= 〈ψ〉φ1 for every ψ ∈ LPAL,
which implies that Mx2 , w1 6|= 〈!〉φ1.
It remains to be shown that APAL cannot distinguish between Mx1 , w1 and
Mx2 , w1, and that AAUL cannot distinguish between M
x
2 , w1 and M
x
3 , w1. The
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(a) The model Mx2 ∗ Ux.
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(b) The model Mx3 ∗ ψx.
Figure 9: The updated models Mx2 ∗ Ux and Mx3 ∗ ψx.
proofs of these claims are by induction, but there is one complication: due to
the update modalities our induction hypothesis has to apply not only to Mi
and Mj , but also to certain submodels of Mi and Mj . We call these submodels
APAL-equivalent and AAUL-equivalent.
Definition 10. Let Nx1 = (WN1 , RN1 , VN1) and N
x
2 = (WN2 , RN2 , VN2) be
submodels of Mx1 and M
x
2 respectively. We say that N
x
1 and N
x
2 are APAL-
equivalent if
• Nx1 and Nx2 can be obtained from Mx1 and Mx2 respectively by a finite
sequence of public announcements,
• for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have wi ∈WN1 if and only if wi ∈WN2 .
Note that public announcements only remove arrows that go to or from a
world that is removed. As a result, two APAL-equivalent models Nx1 and N
x
2
also have the property that (wi, wj) ∈ RN1 if and only if (wi, wj) ∈ RN2 (for all
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
Lemma 6. Let Nx1 = (WN1 , RN1 , VN1) and N
x
2 = (WN2 , RN2 , VN2) be submod-
els of Mx1 and M
x
2 respectively that are APAL-equivalent, let ϕ ∈ LAPAL and
suppose x ∈ P \ {p} is a propositional variable that does not occur in ϕ. Then
for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if wi ∈ WN1 then ϕ does not distinguish between Nx1 , wi
and Nx2 , wi.
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Proof. Fix any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that wi ∈WN1 (and therefore also wi ∈WN2).
We show by induction that ϕ does not distinguish between Nx1 , wi and N
x
2 , wi.
As base case, suppose that ϕ ∈ P . The pointed models Nx1 , wi and Mx2 , wi
agree on all propositional variables other than x. By assumption ϕ does not
contain x, so it does not distinguish between those worlds.
As induction hypothesis, assume that ϕ 6∈ P and that the lemma holds for
all subformulas of ϕ. If a Boolean combination distinguishes between two worlds
then so does at least one of the combined formulas, so we can assume without
loss of generality that the main connective of ϕ is not Boolean. Furthermore,
there are only arrows for agent a so we can assume without loss of generality
that every b operator has a = b. This means that ϕ is of the form aϕ′, [ϕ′]ϕ′′
or [!]ϕ′ for some ϕ′, ϕ′′ ∈ LAPAL.
• Suppose ϕ = aϕ′. The models Nx1 , wi and Nx2 , wi are APAL-equivalent,
so a world wj is accessible from wi in N
x
1 if and only if it is accessible in
Nx2 . In order for ϕ to distinguish between N
x
1 , wi and N
x
2 , wi it is therefore
necessary that ϕ′ distinguishes between Nx2 , wj and N
x
3 , wj for some wj .
That would contradict the induction hypothesis, so ϕ does not distinguish
between Nx1 , wi and N
x
2 , wi.
• Suppose ϕ = [ϕ′]ϕ′′. We claim that Nx1 ∗ ϕ′ and Nx2 ∗ ϕ′ are APAL-
equivalent. Suppose towards a contradiction that they are not APAL-
equivalent. Then there is some world wj from N
x
1 and N
x
2 that is retained
in Nx1 ∗ ϕ′ but not in Nx2 ∗ ϕ′, or retained in Nx2 ∗ ϕ′ but not in Nx1 ∗ ϕ′.
That means ϕ′ must distinguish between Nx1 , wj and N
x
2 , wj , contradicting
the induction hypothesis. We have arrived at a contradiction, so our
assumption that Nx1 ∗ ϕ′ and Nx2 ∗ ϕ′ are not APAL-equivalent must be
wrong.
It then follows from the induction hypothesis that ϕ′′ does not distin-
guish between Nx1 ∗ ϕ′, wi and Nx2 ∗ ϕ′, wi, which implies that ϕ does not
distinguish between Nx1 , wi and N
x
2 , wi.
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• Suppose ϕ = [!]ϕ′. Every world in Nx1 is uniquely identified by whether
it satisfies p. Every world in Nx2 is uniquely identified by whether it
satisfies p and x: w1 satisfies p∧¬x, w2 satisfies ¬p∧¬x and w3 satisfies
p∧x. This means that for every formula ψ ∈ LPAL there is some formula
ψ′ ∈ LPAL such that, for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have Nx1 , wj |= ψ if and
only if Nx2 , wj |= ψ′. Likewise, for every formula ψ′ ∈ LPAL there is some
ψ ∈ LPAL such that, for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Nx1 , wj |= ψ if and only if
Nx2 , wj |= ψ′.
In either case, Nx1 ∗ψ and Nx2 ∗ψ′ are APAL-equivalent. By the induction
hypothesis this implies that ϕ′ cannot distinguish between Nx1 ∗ψ,wi and
Nx2 ∗ψ′, wi. As a result, there is a formula ψ ∈ LPAL such that Nx1 , wi 6|=
[ψ]ϕ′ if and only if there is a formula ψ′ ∈ LPAL such that Nx2 , wi 6|= [ψ′]ϕ′.
In other words, Nx1 , wi 6|= [!]ϕ′ if and only if Nx2 , wi 6|= [!]ϕ′.
In each of the three possible cases ϕ does not distinguish between Nx1 , wi and
Nx2 , wi, completing the induction step and thereby the proof.
The proof that AAUL cannot distinguish between Nx2 , w1 and N
x
3 , w1 is very
similar to the preceding proof, so we omit some of the details.
Definition 11. Let Nx2 = (WN2 , RN2 , VN2) and N
x
3 = (WN3 , RN3 , VN3) be
submodels of Mx2 and M
x
3 respectively. We say that N
x
2 and N
x
3 are AAUL-
equivalent if
• Nx2 and Nx3 can be obtained from Mx2 and Mx3 respectively by a finite
sequence of arrow updates,
• for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} we have (wi, wj) ∈ RN2 if and only if (wi, wj) ∈
RN3 .
Lemma 7. Let Nx2 = (WN2 , RN2 , VN2) and N
x
3 = (WN2 , RN2 , VN2) be submod-
els of Mx2 and M
x
3 respectively that are AAUL-equivalent, let ϕ ∈ LAAUL and
suppose x ∈ P \ {p} is a propositional variable that does not occur in ϕ. Then
for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, ϕ does not distinguish between Nx2 , wi and Nx3 , wi.
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Proof. Fix any i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We show by induction that ϕ does not distinguish
between Nx2 , wi and N
x
3 , wi. As base case, suppose that ϕ ∈ P . The models
agree on all propositional variables other than x, so ϕ does not distinguish
between them.
As induction hypothesis, assume that ϕ 6∈ P and that the lemma holds for
all subformulas of ϕ. We can assume without loss of generality that ϕ is of the
form aϕ′, [U ]ϕ′ or [l]ϕ′ for some U ∈ LAAUL and ϕ′ ∈ LAAUL.
• Suppose ϕ = aϕ′. The models Nx2 and Nx3 are AAUL-equivalent so a
world wj is accessible from wi in one of the models if and only if it is
accessible in the other model. By the induction hypothesis ϕ′ does not
distinguish between Nx2 , wj and N
x
3 , wj , so ϕ does not distinguish between
Nx2 , wi and N
x
3 , wi.
• Suppose ϕ = [U ]ϕ′. We claim that Nx2 ∗ U and Nx3 ∗ U are AAUL-
equivalent. In order for any arrow (wj , wk) to be retained in one of the
models but not the other, there would have to be a clause (ψ, a, ψ′) ∈ U
such that ψ distinguishes between Nx2 , wj and N
x
3 , wj or ψ
′ distinguishes
between Nx2 , wk and N
x
3 , wk. This would contradict the induction hypoth-
esis, so the models are AAUL-equivalent.
It then follows from the induction hypothesis that ϕ′ does not distinguish
between Nx2 ∗ U,wi and Nx3 ∗ U,wi, which implies that ϕ does not distin-
guish between Nx2 , wi and N
x
3 , wi.
• Suppose ϕ = [l]ϕ′. Every world in Nx2 can be uniquely identified by a
combination of p and x, as can every world in Nx3 . This implies that for
every U ∈ LAUL there is some U ′ ∈ LAUL such that Nx2 ∗U and Nx3 ∗U ′ are
AAUL-equivalent, and that for every U ′ ∈ LAUL there is some U ∈ LAUL
such that Nx2 ∗ U and Nx3 ∗ U ′ are AAUL-equivalent.
By the induction hypotheses ϕ′ cannot distinguish between Nx2 ∗U,wi and
Nx3 ∗U ′, wi if Nx2 ∗U and Nx3 ∗U ′ are AAUL-equivalent. This means that
Nx2 , wi 6|= [l]ϕ′ if and only if Nx3 , wi 6|= [l]ϕ′.
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For each of the possible forms of ϕ we have shown that it does not distinguish
between Nx2 , wi and N
x
3 , wi. This completes the induction step and thereby the
proof.
Using the three lemmas we can easily show that APAL and AAUL are in-
comparable in expressivity.
Theorem 1. LAPAL ‖ LAAUL.
Proof. Recall that φ1 = ap ∧ ♦a¬ap. Suppose towards a contradiction that
there is some ψ ∈ LAPAL that is equivalent to 〈l〉φ1. This ψ contains a finite
number of propositional variables and P is infinite, so take an x ∈ P \ {p} that
does not occur in ψ.
By Lemma 5 we know that 〈l〉φ1 distinguishes between Mx1 , w1 and Mx2 , w1.
By Lemma 6 we know that ψ does not distinguish between Mx1 , w1 and M
x
2 , w1.
This contradicts the assumption that ψ is equivalent to 〈l〉φ1. It follows that
there is no ψ ∈ LAPAL that is equivalent to 〈l〉φ1 and therefore that LAAUL 6
LAPAL.
Now suppose towards a contradiction that there is some ψ ∈ LAAUL that
is equivalent to 〈!〉φ1. Again, take an x ∈ P \ {p} that does not occur in ψ.
By Lemma 5 we know that 〈!〉φ1 distinguishes between Mx2 , w1 and Mx3 , w1 and
by Lemma 7 we know that ψ does not. This contradicts our assumption, so
there is no ψ ∈ LAAUL that is equivalent to 〈!〉φ1. We therefore have LAPAL 6
LAAUL, which together with the previous conclusion LAAUL 6 LAPAL shows
that LAPAL ‖ LAAUL.
Because LEL ⊂ LAPAL and LEL ⊂ LAAUL we also get the following, rather
unsurprising, corollary.
Corollary 1. LEL ≺ LAPAL and LEL ≺ LAAUL.
4.2. Expressivity on smaller classes of models
Above we chose a finite set A of agents and a countably infinite set P of
propositional variables. Furthermore, we allowed all Kripke models. We con-
sider these choices to be reasonable: if we model a real-life situation we expect
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Figure 10: The one-world, one agent S5 model Mx4 .
the number of agents (represented by A) that are involved to be finite13, whereas
the number of potential facts (represented by P ) might be infinite. Furthermore,
the class of all Kripke models seems to be the “natural habitat” or arrow up-
dates, since most of the smaller classes (such as S4, KD45 and S5) are not
preserved under arrow updates.
Still, it is interesting to know the relative expressivity of APAL and AAUL
if we use smaller A and P , or a smaller class of models. There are a lot of
different combinations of A, P and a class of models. So we cannot feasibly give
expressivity results for every one of them. Instead we only present a few salient
results. Furthermore, for reasons of brevity, we only sketch most of the proofs.
First, let us consider the case where A = {a} is a singleton, P is infinite and
we use the class of S5 models.
Definition 12. Let x ∈ P . Consider the one-world one-agent model Mx4 =
(W4, R4, V
x
4 ) given by
• W4 = {w1},
• R4(a) = W4 ×W4,
• V x4 (x) = {w1},
• V x4 (p) = ∅ for p 6= x.
The model Mx4 is shown in Figure 10.
Definition 13. Let x ∈ P . Consider the two-world one-agent model Mx5 =
(W5, R5, V
x
5 ), given
13Note that the proofs given so far do not depend on A being finite. So we could safely
allow an infinite set of agents.
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Figure 11: The two-world, one agent S5 model Mx5 .
• W5 = {w1, w2},
• R5(a) = W5 ×W5,
• V x5 (x) = {w1},
• V x5 (p) = ∅ for p 6= x.
The model Mx5 is shown in Figure 11
Theorem 2. If A = {a} and P is countable infinite, then LEL(A,P ) ≺S5
LAAUL(A,P ).
Sketch of proof. No formula in the language of EL distinguishes Mx4 , w from
Mx5 , w for all x ∈ P , since any epistemic formula only involves finitely many
propositional variables.
If we execute the arrow update (x, a,¬x) in Mx5 , the result is a model where
the only remaining arrow is from w1 to w2. A picture of the updated model is
given in Figure 12. The AAUL formula 〈l〉♦aa⊥ therefore holds in Mx5 , w1.
It clearly does not hold in Mx4 , w, so 〈l〉♦aa⊥ can distinguish between Mx4 , w
and Mx5 , w for all x ∈ P .
This implies that there is no single EL formula that is equivalent to the
AAUL formula 〈l〉♦aa⊥, so LAAUL(A,P ) 6 LEL(A,P ). We trivially have
LEL(A,P )  LAAUL(A,P ), so it follows that LEL(A,P ) ≺S5 LAAUL(A,P ).
Corollary 2. If A = {a} and P is countably infinite, then LAPAL(A,P ) ≺S5
LAAUL(A,P ).
Proof. In [5, Proposition 3.12], it is proven that single-agent arbitrary announce-
ment logic is equally expressive as epistemic logic over S5, irrespective of the
size of P . Hence the corollary follows.
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Figure 12: The updated model Mx5 ∗ {(x, a,¬x)}.
The difference in expressivity for one-agent S5 relies on the set of proposi-
tional variables being infinite. When this set is finite it is in fact the case that
quantifying over arrow updates does not add any expressivity.
Theorem 3. If A = {a} and P is finite, then LEL(A,P ) ≡S5 LAAUL(A,P ).
Proof. In single agent S5 with a finite number of atoms, we can use a finite set
Φ ⊂ LEL of characteristic formulas to identify each model up to bisimilarity.
AAUL is invariant under bisimulation, so for each AAUL formula ψ and every
χ ∈ Φ we have either |=S5 χ → ψ or |=S5 χ → ¬ψ. As a result, |=S5 ψ ↔∧
χ∈Φ χ→ δχ, where δχ = > if |=S5 χ→ ψ and δχ = ⊥ if |=S5 χ→ ¬ψ.
But now suppose that we have not one agent but two. We show that then
arbitrary arrow updates add expressivity, even if P is a singleton. Consider the
following set of models:
Definition 14. Let m,n ∈ N \ {0} be two positive integers. We now define the
model Mmn = (Wmn, Rmn, Vmn) as follows:
• Wmn = {si | 0 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {ti | 0 ≤ i ≤ n},
• Rmn(a) = ({(s0, t0)} ∪ {(si, si+1) | i is odd} ∪ {(ti, ti+1) | i is odd})∗,
• Rmn(b) = ({(si, si+1) | i is even} ∪ {(si, si+1) | i is even})∗,
• Vmn(p) = {sm, sn},
where ∗ is a transitive reflexive closure operator. The model Mmn is shown in
Figure 13.
Theorem 4. If A = {a, b} and P = {p}, then LEL ≺S5 LAAUL.
34
pp
abab
a
b a a b
m
n
Figure 13: The model Mmn.
Sketch of proof. Let χ := ♦aa⊥, ξ0 := ¬p and ξk+1 = aξk ∧ bξk for every
k ∈ N \ {0}. So ξk means that there is no p world reachable in k or fewer steps.
Take any m,n ∈ N \ {0} such that m 6= n. If m > n, then Mmn, s0 |=
〈(ξn, a,>)〉χ. Likewise, if m < n, then Mmn, s0 |= 〈(¬ξm, a,>)〉χ. So if m 6= n
we have Mmn, s0 |= 〈l〉χ.
If m = n on the other hand, then there is no way to distinguish between s0
and t0. This implies that Mmn, s0 6|= 〈l〉χ. So 〈l〉χ distinguishes between the
models with m = n and the models with m 6= n.
Every ψ ∈ LEL is of finite modal depth dψ. If m and n are both greater
than dψ, then ψ cannot distinguish between the cases m = n and m 6= n. This
implies that LEL(A,P ) 6 LAAUL(A,P ).
APAL with two agents is more expressive than EL [5, Proposition 3.14], so
Theorem 4 does not give us a counterpart to Corollary 2. We can, however, use a
separate proof to show that, if A = {a, b} and P = {p}, then LAAUL(A,P ) 6S5
LAPAL(A,P ).
Theorem 5. If A = {a, b} and P = {p}, then LAAUL(A,P ) 6S5 LAPAL(A,P ).
Sketch of proof. Recall that 〈l〉χ ∈ LAAUL distinguishes between the models
Mmn with m = n and those with m 6= n.
Now suppose there is a formula ψ ∈ LAPAL that distinguishes those models
where m = n from those where m 6= n. This formula ψ is of depth dψ. Take
m and n to be larger than dψ. It is clear that no epistemic formula will reach
sm or tn, and after a public announcement that changes the model this remains
the case, since public announcements preserve S5. Hence ψ will not be able
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to distinguish the cases above dψ where m = n from m 6= n. This implies
that ψ is not equivalent to 〈l〉χ, since that formula does distinguish the models
with m = n from those with m 6= n. This is true for any ψ ∈ LAPAL, so
LAAUL(A,P ) 6S5 LAPAL(A,P ).
The question whether LAPAL(A,P ) ≺S5 LAPAL(A,P ) or LAPAL(A,P ) ‖S5
LAPAL(A,P ) if A = {a, b} and P = {p} remains open, although we suspect the
latter to be the case.
4.3. Comparisons to other logics
In the preceding sections we compared LEL, LAPAL and LAAUL to each
other. In this section we compare LAAUL to three different logics.
From a technical perspective the comparisons made in this section are rather
trivial. Our reason for presenting the results anyway is that they point to
interesting differences between different types of quantification. For reasons of
brevity we do not give full definitions of the logics considered here; instead we
provide references to publications that do contain definitions.
First, let us compare LAAUL to epistemic logic with common knowledge
(ELC)14. In AAUL the operator [l] quantifies over an infinite number of updates.
As a result, [l]ϕ could be seen as an infinite conjunction ∧U∈LAUL [U ]ϕ. In ELC
the operator CA likewise represents an infinite quantification; a formula CAϕ
can be seen as an infinite conjunction
∧
i∈NE
i
Aϕ (where EA is an “everybody
knows” operator).
We can use the models Mmn to show that LAAUL ‖S5 LELC . As can be seen
in Figure 13 at sm and tn either ap is true or bp is true. Using a common
knowledge formula one can express what happens at the end, yet there is no
formula in AAUL (or APAL for that matter) that is able to express this.
Theorem 6. LAAUL ‖S5 LELC .
14See for example [20].
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Sketch of proof. Like LEL, the language LELC cannot distinguish those pointed
models Mmn, s0 where m = n from those where m 6= n.15 This can be seen
with model comparison games as they are for instance discussed in [16]. For any
depth d, one can choose m and n sufficiently large, such that any C-move in
such a game by spoiler can be matched by duplicator by choosing a world that
is equivalent up to depth d. Hence ELC is not at least as expressive as AAUL.
Consider the formula Cˆabap. This formula is true in all models Mmn where
either m or n is odd and false in all models where both m and n are even. Yet,
there is no formula in AAUL that distinguishes these. The quantifier in AAUL
cannot distinguish between updates with formulas that depend on ap being
true at the final worlds or any other formula.
Corollary 3. LAPAL ‖S5 LELC .
Sketch of proof. The proof of Theorem 6 can be adapted to show that the APAL
is not comparable to ELC by slightly adapting the valuation of p in the models
Mmn to include s0 and t0. If m 6= n, there is some public announcement that
detects the difference in length between the two sides. This announcement can
then be used to remove one of s1 and t1 but not the other. If m = n, on the
other hand, then s0 and t0 are bisimilar and so are s1 and t1. The formula
〈!〉(bp ∧ ♦a¬bp) therefore distinguishes the cases where m = n from those
where m 6= n. ELC still cannot distinguish between m = n and m 6= n, so
LAPAL 6 LELC .
Like AAUL, APAL cannot distinguish the cases where m and n are even from
those where they are not. ELC can do this, so LELC 6 LAPAL, completing the
proof.
Let us consider two more logics, refinement modal mogic (RML) [12] and
arbitrary action model logic (AAML) [19].
15LELC can distinguish the pointed models Mmn, s0 where m = n mod 2 from those where
m 6= n mod 2, but that is not sufficient to distinguish m = n from m 6= n.
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Corollary 4. LRML ≺S5 LAAUL.
Proof. RML is equally expressive as EL (see [12, Proposition 36]). It therefore
follows from LEL ≺S5 LAAUL that LRML ≺S5 LAAUL.
Corollary 5. LAAML ≺S5 LAAUL.
Proof. [19, Corollary IV.5] shows that AAML is equally expressive as EL. It
follows that LAAML ≺S5 LAAUL.
An overview of the expressivity results discussed so far can be seen in Figure
14. The interesting thing about these different expressivity results is that they
show that changing the scope of quantification can have wildly different effects.
Let X and Y be two different operators that quantify over some sets SX and
SY . Then, in general, we would expect that logics using X to be incomparable
to logics using Y (unless SX = SY ).
After all, if SX 6⊆ SY and SY 6⊆ SX then X and Y seem unrelated so we
should expect logics using them to be incomparable. But if SX ⊂ SY then, by
the reasoning presented in Section 4.1 we expect there to be worlds that can be
distinguished by Xϕ but not Y ϕ as well as worlds that can be distinguished by
Y ϕ but not Xϕ.
Some of the logics studied and mentioned in this paper follow this expected
pattern. The logics ELC, APAL and AAUL are indeed incomparable in expres-
sivity. But, somewhat surprisingly, RML and AAML are equally expressive as
EL and therefore less expressive than ELC, APAL and AAUL.
It therefore seems an interesting question for further research to ask why
going from APAL to AAUL is so different to going from AAUL to AAML.
Additionally, we could wonder whether there is any interesting set S larger
than the set of arrow updates but smaller than the set of action models, with
the property that quantification over S adds expressivity to EL.
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Figure 14: A comparison of the expressivity of several logics, when considered over the class
of all Kripke models. An arrow from one logic to another means that the second logic is at
least as expressive as the first. The “at least as expressive as” relation is transitive, so for
reasons of clarity we omit some arrows that follow from transitivity. Borders around sets of
logics indicate equivalence classes of equi-expressive logics.
5. Model Checking for AAUL
Here we show that the model checking problem for AAUL is PSPACE-
complete. This is as expected, considering that the model checking problems
for APAL and Group Announcement Logic are known to be PSPACE-complete
as well [2]. Indeed, the proofs presented in this section are inspired by the
ones given in [2]. Recall that, as shown in [25], the model checking for AUL is
in PTIME. So the [l] operator significantly increases the complexity of model
checking.
In order to show that the model checking problem for AAUL is PSPACE-
complete we have to show that it is PSPACE-hard and that it is in PSPACE.
We start by proving that it is PSPACE-hard.
5.1. Model Checking for AAUL is PSPACE hard
We show that the QBF-SAT problem can be reduced to the model checking
problem for AAUL. Since QBF-SAT is known to be PSPACE-complete, this
shows that AAUL model checking is PSPACE-hard.
Let us start by very briefly describing the QBF-SAT problem. Let n ∈
N be given, as well as Q1, · · · , Qn ∈ {∀,∃} and let Φ = Φ(p1, · · · , pn) be a
Boolean formula containing n propositional variables. The QBF-SAT problem
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Figure 15: The model MnHa used to show PSPACE-hardness.
for n,Q1, · · · , Qn and Φ is to determine whether Q1p1 · · ·Qnpn : Φ(p1, · · · , pn)
is true.16 A simple instance of the problem would be ∀p1∃p2 : (p2 → p1). The
propositional variables are considered as Boolean variables here, so this instance
could also be denoted ∀p1 ∈ {>,⊥}∃p2 ∈ {>,⊥} : (p2 → p1), which happens to
be true.
In order to reduce QBF-SAT to the model checking of AAUL, we need to
create a corresponding model and an AAUL formula for each instance of QBF-
SAT, with both this model and the formula having size polynomial in that of
the instance. We start by constructing the model. The model, MnHa , depends
only on n, and is shown in Figure 15. The idea is that we will force a number
of arbitrary arrow updates to choose between a world w+i (corresponding to the
choice pi = >) and a world w−i (corresponding to the choice pi = ⊥).
We will now define the formula corresponding to a QBF-SAT instance. First,
in order to force the arbitrary arrow updates to choose one of the worlds, let us
define a number of useful subformulas. For 1 ≤ m ≤ n let
γm :=
∧
1≤i≤m
((♦pi ∨ ♦qi) ∧ ¬(♦pi ∧ ♦qi)) ∧
∧
m<j≤n
(♦pj ∧ ♦qj).
In other words, γm holds if and only if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m the arrow to exactly
one of w+i and w
−
i is eliminated, while for every m < j ≤ n both w+j and
w−j are still reachable. This means that the values of all pi with i ≤ m have
16We could equivalently ask whether Q1p1 · · ·QnpnΦ(p1, · · · , pn) is satisfiable, the formula
has no free variables so truth and satisfiability coincide.
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been chosen, but the values of all pj with j > m have not. Now, consider the
following, recursively defined, formula.
Ψn+1 := Φ(♦p1, · · · ,♦pn)
Ψm :=
 [l](γm → Ψm+1) if Qm = ∀〈l〉(γm ∧Ψm+1) if Qm = ∃
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n
Ψ := Ψ1
For our example formula ∀p1∃p2 : (p2 → p1) we obtain, writing ♦pi ↔ ¬♦qi for
(♦pi ∨ ♦qi) ∧ ¬(♦pi ∧ ♦qi) the following formula Ψ:
[l] (((♦p1 ↔ ¬♦q1) ∧ (♦p2 ∧ ♦q2))→
〈l〉((♦p1 ↔ ¬♦q1) ∧ (♦p2 ↔ ¬♦q2) ∧ (♦p2 → ♦p1)))
We leave it to the reader to verify that Ψ holds in M2Ha , w.
Lemma 8. MnHa , w |= Ψ iff Q1p1 · · ·Qnpn : Φ(p1, · · · , pn) is true.
Proof. Recall that γm holds at w in any submodel of M
n
Ha if and only if for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m exactly one of w+i and w−i remains reachable, and for every
m < i ≤ n both w+i and w−i remain reachable. This means we can interpret
any submodel satisfying γm as a choice for the values of p1, · · · , pm, where pi
takes value > if and only if the arrow to w+i is retained (so if and only if ♦pi
holds in w). The arbitrary updates [l] and 〈l〉 can therefore be seen as universal
and existential quantifiers for the choice of pi. Finally, Ψn+1 checks whether
Q(p1, · · · , pn) holds for the chosen values of the pi.
Corollary 6. The model checking problem for AAUL is PSPACE-hard.
5.2. Model Checking for AAUL is in PSPACE
Left to show is that the model checking problem for AAUL is in PSPACE.
We do this by presenting an algorithm MCheck(M,w,ϕ) that returns true if and
only if M,w |= ϕ and false if and only if M,w 6|= ϕ. MCheck(M,w,ϕ) works by
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a case distinction on the main connective of ϕ. Most cases are exactly as one
would expect; MCheck(M,w,ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) returns true if either MCheck(M,w,ϕ1)
or MCheck(M,w,ϕ1) does, and so on. For reasons of brevity we only consider
the interesting cases, and omit the trivial ones. Let M = (W,R, V ) and w ∈W .
The two cases that we consider in detail are ϕ = [U ]χ and ϕ = [l]χ. We
start with the case ϕ = [U ]χ, where U = (ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · , (ϕn, an, ψn). In order
to solve MCheck(M,w,ϕ) we simply have to call MCheck(M ∗ U,w, χ); the
difficult part is to compute M ∗ U . We can do so as follows.
1. for every w′ ∈ W and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, label w′ with ϕi iff MCheck(M,w′, ϕi)
returns true, and with ψi iff MCheck(M,w
′, ψi) does.
2. for every a ∈ A, (w1, w2) ∈ R(a) and (ϕi, a, ψi) ∈ U , if w1 is labeled ϕi
and w2 is labeled ψi, then label (w1, w2) with “keep.”
3. for every a ∈ A and (w1, w2) ∈ R(a), if (w1, w2) is not labeled “keep,”
then remove it.
The other non-trivial case is ϕ = [l]χ. We would like to solve this us-
ing “brute force,” so for every U we would like to check whether [U ]χ holds.
Unfortunately, there are infinitely many different arrow updates, so we cannot
check them all. But while there are infinitely many different updates U , there
are only finitely many different updated models M ∗ U . So instead of running
MCheck(M,w, [U ]χ) for every U , we run MCheck(M ∗ U,w, χ) for all different
M ∗ U .
It is not the case that every submodel of M is of the form M ∗ U for some
U , so we need to determine which submodels can be represented as M ∗ U . In
order to do this, we use the definitions and results about bisimilarity that were
introduced in Section 3. In particular, we use the bisimulation contraction MBC
of M (see Definition 5).
For any state w, the pointed model M,w is bisimilar to MBC , [w] and AAUL
is bisimulation invariant, as discussed in Section 3, so we are free to work with
MBC instead ofM . InMBC no two different worlds are bisimilar, which, because
we are working with finite models, means that every two sets of worlds are
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distinguishable. As such, every submodel (WBC , R
′, VBC) of MBC is of the
form MBC ∗ U for some U . The [l]χ case in MCheck(M,w,ϕ) is therefore as
follows.
1. compute MBC = (WBC , RBC , VBC).
2. for every submodel M ′ = (WBC , R′, VBC), if MCheck(M ′, [w], χ) returns
false, then return false
3. return true
We consider the correctness of MCheck(M,w,ϕ) to be immediately clear,
but it remains to show that it requires at most polynomial space. So let us do
some complexity analysis. In the [U ]χ case we need to run MCheck(M,w′, ϕi)
and MCheck(M,w′, ψi) for all w′ ∈W , but we can do those one at a time, so we
need to keep only one in memory. We do need to keep O(|U |·|M |) ≤ O(|ϕ|·|M |)
different labels in memory, as well as the submodel M ∗ U which is of size at
most O(|M |). The total space requirement for MCheck(M,w, [U ]χ) is therefore
O(|ϕ| · |M |) plus the maximum space requirement of MCheck(M ∗ U,w, χ),
MCheck(M,w′, ϕi) and MCheck(M,w′, ψi) for every i, w′.
In the [l]χ case we first need to compute MBC . This can be done in poly-
nomial time and O(|M |) space, by using the Paige-Tarjan algorithm [27]. If we
use depth-first search we need to store only two additional models at a time,
namely MBC and M
′. Both are of size at most O(|M |). Finally, we need the
space required to run MCheck(M ′, [w], χ).
So the [U ]χ and [l]χ cases take at most O(|ϕ| · |M |) space, plus whatever is
required to do the model checking for their subformulas. All other cases take less
space. This means that every connective adds at most O(|ϕ| · |M |) to the space
requirement. There are at most O(|ϕ|) connectives in ϕ, so MCheck(M,w,ϕ)
requires at most O(|ϕ|2 · |M |) space. This means we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Model checking for AAUL is in PSPACE.
Corollary 7. Model checking for AAUL is PSPACE-complete.
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6. Proof system
In this section we introduce an infinitary proof system for AAUL. This sys-
tem is a conservative extension of the proof system for AUL given in [22]. The
axiom and rule for the arbitrary arrow update are very similar to the axiom
and rule for APAL given in [6]. The completeness proof we give for it, is very
closely related to the proof system for APAL given in [6]. Before introducing
the proof system, we need an auxiliary definition.
Definition 15. Let x 6∈ P be a new atom. The set NF of formulas that are in
necessity form is generated by the following normal form:
ξ(x) ::= x | ϕ→ ξ(x) | aξ(x) | [U ]ξ(x)
where ϕ ∈ LAAUL and U ∈ LAAUL. Given a formula ψ and a formula ξ(x) ∈ NF
in necessity form, we use ξ(ψ) to denote the result of replacing the unique
occurrence of x in ξ(x) by ψ.
Lemma 10. If ϕ = ξ([l]ψ) for some ξ(x) ∈ NF then this representation of ϕ
is unique, i.e. if ϕ = ξ′([l]ψ′) then ξ′(x) = ξ(x) and ψ′ = ψ.
Proof. For given χ,U ∈ LAAUL, we can consider χ→, a and [U ] to be unary
operators. The symbol x can only occur inside the scope of such unary operators.
These three operators do not include [l], so the [l] operators in ξ([l]ψ) and
ξ′([l]ψ′) must both be the outermost [l] operator.
Now, we can consider the proof system LAAUL.
Definition 16. The proof system LAAUL is given by the following eight axiom
schemata and four rules.
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(A1) All instances of propositional tautologies
(A2) a(ϕ→ ψ)→ (aϕ→ aψ)
(A3) [U ]p↔ p
(A4) [U ]¬ϕ↔ ¬[U ]ϕ
(A5) [U ](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ)
(A6) [U ]aϕ↔
∧
(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → a(χ→ [U ]ϕ))
(A7) [U ][U ′]ϕ↔ [U × U ′]ϕ where U × U ′ =
{(ψ1 ∧ [U ]ψ2, a, χ1 ∧ [U ]χ2) | (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈ U, (ψ2, a, χ2) ∈ U ′}
(A8) [l]ϕ→ [U0]ϕ where U0 ∈ LAUL
(R1) From ϕ→ ψ and ϕ, infer ψ.
(R2) From ϕ, infer aϕ.
(R3) From ϕ, infer [U ]ϕ.
(R4) From {ξ([U0]ϕ) | U0 ∈ LAUL}, infer ξ([l]ϕ), where ξ(x) ∈ NF .
A formula ϕ can be derived in LAAUL if it is a member of the smallest set of
formulas that contains all instances of (A1) – (A8) and that is closed under (R1)
– (R4). If ϕ can be derived in LAAUL we call ϕ a theorem (of LAAUL) and write
` ϕ.
Axioms (A1), (A2) and rules (R1) and (R2) together are the basic multi-
agent modal system K. Axioms (A3), . . . , (A7) are all so-called reduction
axioms for the arrow update, i.e. going from left to right the number of arrow
updates reduces ((A3) and (A7)) or the complexity of the formulas to which the
arrow update is applied reduces ((A4), (A5) and (A6)). This means one can
effectively translate any formula without arbitrary arrow updates to a provably
equivalent formula of multi-agent modal logic, as was shown in [22]. Axioms
(A8) and rule (R4) deal with arbitrary arrow updates, and given their presence
in the proof system, one also needs (R3) for completeness. Note that while a
rule “From ϕ, infer [l]ϕ” is not included in the proof system, it is derivable.
After all, if ` ϕ then (R3) allows us to derive [U ]ϕ for all U ∈ LAUL. Since
x ∈ NF , this allows us to derive [l]ϕ by (R4). Before proving the soundness of
LAAUL, let us consider one lemma.
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Lemma 11. Rule (R4) is truth preserving. That is, if ξ(x) ∈ NF , ϕ ∈ LAAUL
and M,w are such that M,w |= ξ([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL, then we have
M,w |= ξ([l]ϕ).
Proof. By induction on the construction of ξ(x). As base case, suppose ξ(x) = x.
If M,w |= [U0]ϕ for all U0 ∈ LAUL it follows immediately from the semantics of
AAUL that M,w |= [l]ϕ. So (R4) is sound for ξ(x) = x.
Suppose then as induction hypothesis that ξ(x) 6= x and that the lemma
holds for every ξ′(x) that precedes ξ(x) in the recursive definition of NF. There
are three possibilities for the form of ξ(x).
The first possibility is that ξ(x) = ψ → ξ′(x). Fix any M,w and ϕ, and
suppose that that M,w |= ψ → ξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL. If M,w 6|= ψ
then, trivially, M,w |= ψ → ξ′([l]ϕ). If, on the other hand, M,w |= ψ then
M,w |= ξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL and therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
M,w |= ξ′([l]ϕ). This implies that M,w |= ψ → ξ′([l]ϕ). In either case, from
M,w |= ξ([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL it follows that M,w |= ξ([l]ϕ).
The second possibility is that ξ(x) = aξ′(x). Fix any M,w and ϕ, and
suppose that M,w |= aξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL. Let w′ be any world that
is a-accessible from w in M . We have M,w′ |= ξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL and
therefore, by the induction hypothesis, M,w′ |= ξ′([l]ϕ). This holds for every
a-successor of w, so M,w |= aξ′([l]ϕ).
The third and final possibility is that ξ(x) = [U ]ξ′(x). Again, fix any M,w
and ϕ, and suppose that M,w |= [U ]ξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL. Then (M ∗
U), w |= ξ′([U0]ϕ) for all U0 ∈ LAUL and therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
(M ∗ U), w |= ξ′([l]ϕ). This, in turn, implies that M,w |= [U ]ξ′([l]ϕ).
We have treated all possible forms of ξ(x). This completes the induction
step and thereby the proof.
Theorem 7 (Soundness of LAAUL). Let ϕ ∈ LAAUL. If ` ϕ, then |= ϕ.
Proof. The soundness of the axioms (A1) – (A5) and (A8) follows immediately
from the semantics of AAUL, as does the soundness of the rules (R1) – (R3).
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The soundness of the non-straightforward axioms (A6) and (A7) follows from
Lemma 1. The soundness of (R4) follows from Lemma 11.
6.1. Completeness of LAAUL: preliminaries
The completeness of ` is, unfortunately but not unusually, harder to prove
than the soundness. Before getting to the main proof we will need a number of
definitions and lemmas. Firstly, we need definitions for the depth and size of
formulas.
Definition 17. Let ϕ ∈ LAAUL. The [l]-depth d(ϕ) of ϕ is given inductively
by
d(p) = 0
d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ)
d(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = max(d(ϕ1), d(ϕ2))
d(aϕ) = d(ϕ)
d(U) = max{d(ϕ1), d(ϕ2) | (ϕ1, a, ϕ2) ∈ U}
d([U ]ϕ) = max(d(U), d(ϕ))
d([l]ϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1
The size s(ϕ) of ϕ is a more complicated measure, given inductively by
s(p) = 1
s(¬ϕ) = s(ϕ) + 1
s(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = s(ϕ1) + s(ϕ2) + 1
s(aϕ) = s(ϕ) + 1
s([l]ϕ) = s(ϕ) + 1
s([U ]ϕ) = s(U)s(ϕ)
s(U) = (|U |+ 2)(9 + 2 · smax(U))
where |U | is the number of clauses in U and
smax(U) = max{s(ψ), s(χ) | (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U}
We write ϕ1 <
s
d ϕ2 if either d(ϕ1) < d(ϕ2) or d(ϕ1) = d(ϕ2) and s(ϕ1) < s(ϕ2).
The measure d(ϕ) is simply the nesting depth of [l] in ϕ. The measure s(ϕ)
does not have such a simple description, it is designed purely to provide us with
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a well-ordering we can do induction on. Specifically, we need it for the following
lemma.
Lemma 12. Let ϕ,ψ, U, U ′ ∈ LAAUL. Then
p <sd [U ]p,
¬[U ]ϕ <sd [U ]¬ϕ,
[U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ <sd [U ](ϕ ∧ ψ),∧
(ψ,a,χ)∈U (ψ → a(χ→ [U ]ϕ)) <sd [U ]aϕ and
[U × U ′]ϕ <sd [U ][U ′]ϕ.
Proof. In all five cases, the formulas on the left and right side of the inequality
have the same [l]-depth. It therefore suffices to show a difference in size. The
first three cases are relatively easy to prove.
Every U contains at least one clause (see Definition 1), so |U | ≥ 1 and
smax(U) ≥ 1. We therefore have
s(U) = (|U |+ 2)(9 + 2 · smac(U)) ≥ 3 · 11 = 33.
It follows that
s(p) = 1 < 33 ≤ s(U)1 = s([U ]p),
and
s(¬[U ]ϕ) = s([U ]ϕ) + 1 < 33 · s([U ]ϕ) ≤ s([U ]¬ϕ).
Furthermore, for every x1 ≥ 2 and x2, x3 ≥ 1, we have xx21 + xx31 + 1 < xx21 ·
xx31 · x1 = xx2+x3+11 . This implies that
s([U ]ϕ ∧ [U ]ψ) = s(U)s(ϕ) + s(U)s(ψ) + 1 < s(U)s(ϕ)+s(ψ)+1 = s([U ](ϕ ∧ ψ)).
Proving the inequality for the last two cases is simple but requires a lot of
bookkeeping. Recall that ψ1 → ψ2 is an abbreviation for ¬(ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2), so
s(ψ → a(χ → [U ]ϕ)) = s(ψ) + s(χ) + 3 + 3 + 1 + s([U ]ϕ). Furthermore,
∧
represents a number of conjunction symbols equal to its number of conjuncts
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minus one. We therefore have
s
 ∧
(ψ,a,χ)∈U
(ψ → a(χ→ [U ]ϕ))
 = ∑
(ψ,a,χ)∈U
s(ψ) + s(χ) + 7 + s([U ]ϕ) + 1
≤ |U |(8 + 2 · smax(U) + s([U ]ϕ)).
Furthermore, for every x1, x2 ≥ 2 we have x1 + x2 ≤ x1 · x2. So 2 · smax(U) +
s([U ]ϕ) ≤ 2s([U ]ϕ) · smax(U). Additionally, 8 < 9s([U ]ϕ). As a result,
|U |(8 + 2 · smax(U) + s([U ]ϕ)) < |U |(9s([U ]ϕ) + 2s([U ]ϕ) · smax(U))
= |U |(9 + 2 · smax(U))s([U ]ϕ)
< (|U |+ 2)(9 + 2 · smax(U))s([U ]ϕ)
= s(U)s([U ]ϕ) = s(U)s(U)s(ϕ)
= s(U)s(ϕ)+1 = s(U)s(aϕ)
= s([U ]aϕ).
Left to show is that [U×U ′]ϕ <sd [U ][U ′]ϕ. Recall that U×U ′ is an abbreviation
for
{(ψ1 ∧ [U ]ψ2, a, χ1 ∧ [U ]χ2) | (ψ1, a, χ1) ∈ U, (ψ2, a, χ2) ∈ U ′}.
This gives us |U × U ′| = |U | · |U ′|. Furthermore, since s(ψ1 ∧ [U ]ψ2) = s(ψ1) +
s(U)s(ψ2) + 1, we also have smax(U × U ′) ≤ smax(U) + s(U)smax(U ′) + 1. We
now want to compare s(U × U ′) to s(U)s(U ′). On the one hand,
s(U × U ′) = (|U × U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2 · smax(U × U ′))
≤ (|U | · |U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2(smax(U) + s(U)smax(U ′) + 1)).
On the other hand, we have
s(U)s(U
′) = s(U)(|U
′|+2)(9+2·smax(U ′))
(By the definition of s(U ′))
≥ s(U)(|U ′|+2)+(9+2·smax(U ′))
(Because x1 · x2 ≥ x1 + x2 for x1, x2 ≥ 2)
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= s(U)|U
′|+2s(U)9+2·smax(U
′)
= ((|U |+ 2)(9 + 2 · smax(U)))|U ′|+2s(U)9+2·smax(U ′)
(By the definition of s(U))
> (|U |+ 2)|U ′|+2s(U)9s(U)2·smax(U ′)
= (|U |+ 2)|U ′|+2((|U |+ 2)(9 + 2 · smax(U)))9s(U)2·smax(U ′)
(By the definition of s(U))
> (|U |+ 2)|U ′|+2(9 + 2 · smax(U))9s(U)2·smax(U ′)
≥ (|U |+ 2)(|U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2smax(U))9s(U)2·smax(U ′)
(Because xx21 ≥ x1 · x2 for x1, x2 ≥ 2)
> (|U | · |U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2smax(U))9s(U)2·smax(U ′)
> (|U | · |U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2(smax(U) + 1 + 1))s(U)smax(U ′)
> (|U | · |U ′|+ 2)(9 + 2(smax(U) + s(U)smax(U ′) + 1)),
Putting these inequalities together, we get s(U × U ′)s(ϕ) <
(
s(U)s(U
′)
)s(ϕ)
,
and therefore
s([U ×U ′]ϕ) = s(U ×U ′)s(ϕ) <
(
s(U)s(U
′)
)s(ϕ)
≤ s(U)(s(U ′)s(ϕ)) = s([U ][U ′]ϕ).
The relevance of Lemma 12 is that, for each of (A3) – (A7), the formula on
the right side of the equivalence is smaller than the formula on the left side.
6.2. Completeness of LAAUL: Lindenbaum lemma
We will now define theories, and work towards a Lindenbaum lemma, which
states that every theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory.
Definition 18. A set Φ ⊆ LAAUL of formulas is a theory if it contains all
theorems and is closed under rules (R1) and (R4).
We do not require Φ to be closed under (R2) and (R3) because, unlike (R1)
and (R4), these rules preserve only validity, not truth. For example, M,w |= ϕ
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does not guarantee M,w |= [U ]ϕ, but M,w |= ϕ → ψ and M,w |= ϕ do
guarantee that M,w |= ψ.
Definition 19. A theory Φ is consistent if there is a ϕ ∈ LAAUL such that
ϕ 6∈ Φ. A theory Φ is maximal if for every formula ϕ ∈ LAAUL either ϕ ∈ Φ or
¬ϕ ∈ Φ.
Lemma 13. Fix any ψ ∈ Φ. The following are equivalent:
1. Φ is inconsistent,
2. there is a ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Φ and ¬ϕ ∈ Φ,
3. ψ ∧ ¬ψ ∈ Φ.
The proof is trivial and left to the reader. We also need some more notation
to define sets of formulas.
Definition 20. Let Φ be a theory and ϕ,U ∈ LAAUL. Then
Φ + ϕ := {ψ | ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ}
aΦ := {ψ | aψ ∈ Φ}
[U ]Φ := {ψ | [U ]ψ ∈ Φ}
First, let us show that Φ+ϕ is an appropriate notation for {ψ | ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ}.
Lemma 14. If Φ is a theory, then ϕ ∈ Φ + ϕ and Φ ⊆ Φ + ϕ.
Proof. Firstly, we have ` ϕ → ϕ and therefore ϕ → ϕ ∈ Φ. This implies that
ϕ ∈ Φ + ϕ. Now, note that ` ψ → (ϕ → ψ) and therefore ψ → (ϕ → ψ) ∈ Φ.
Since Φ is closed under (R1), this implies that if ψ ∈ Φ, then ϕ → ψ ∈ Φ. We
therefore have ψ ∈ Φ + ϕ for all ψ ∈ Φ.
Next, we need two relatively simple lemmas about theories.
Lemma 15. If Φ is a theory, then so are Φ + ϕ, KaΦ and [U ]Φ.
Proof. If ` ψ then also ` ϕ → ψ, ` aψ and ` [U ]ψ. The set of theorems is
therefore a subset of Φ + ϕ, aΦ and [U ]Φ. It remains to be shown that the
three sets are closed under (R1) and (R4).
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Suppose ψ → χ ∈ Φ + ϕ and ψ ∈ Φ + ϕ. Then, by definition, ϕ → (ψ →
χ) ∈ Φ and ϕ → ψ ∈ Φ. By (A1) and (R1) this implies that ϕ → χ ∈ Φ and
therefore χ ∈ Φ + ϕ. So Φ + ϕ is closed under (R1).
Similarly, (A2) and (R1) guarantee that if a(ψ → χ) ∈ Φ and aψ ∈ Φ
then aχ ∈ Φ. Furthermore, (A4), (A5) and (R1) guarantee that if [U ](ψ →
χ), [U ]ψ ∈ Φ then [U ]χ ∈ Φ. The sets aΦ and [U ]Φ are therefore also closed
under (R1).
Now suppose that for some ξ(x) ∈ NF , we have {ξ([U ]ψ) | [U ] ∈ LAUL} ⊆
Φ + ϕ. By the definition of Φ + ϕ, we have {ϕ → ξ([U ]ψ) | [U ] ∈ LAUL} ⊆ Φ,
which implies that ϕ → ξ([l]ψ) ∈ Φ, since ϕ → ξ(x) ∈ NF and Φ is closed
under (R4). Similarly, from aξ(x) ∈ NF and [U ]ξ(x) ∈ NF it follows that
aΦ and [U ]Φ are closed under (R4).
Lemma 16. Φ + ϕ is consistent if and only if ¬ϕ 6∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove that if ¬ϕ ∈ Φ then Φ + ϕ is inconsistent and that if Φ + ϕ is
inconsistent then ¬ϕ ∈ Φ.
Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ Φ. Then, by Lemma 14 we have ¬ϕ ∈ Φ + ϕ and ϕ ∈ Φ + ϕ.
So Φ + ϕ is inconsistent.
Suppose then that Φ + ϕ is inconsistent. Then Φ + ϕ contains all AAUL
formulas, so in particular p ∧ ¬p ∈ Φ + ϕ. This implies that ϕ→ (p ∧ ¬p) ∈ Φ.
Since (ϕ → (p ∧ ¬p)) → ¬ϕ is a propositional tautology and Φ is closed under
modus ponens this implies that ¬ϕ ∈ Φ.
We now have all we need to prove our Lindenbaum lemma.
Lemma 17 (Lindenbaum lemma). Every consistent theory can be extended to
a maximal consistent theory.
Proof. Let Φ be a consistent theory. The set of all AAUL formulas is countably
infinite, so we can enumerate it as {ϕ0, ϕ1, · · · }. Define the sequence Φn of
theories inductively as follows.
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Φ0 = Φ
Φn+1 = Φn + ϕn if ¬ϕn 6∈ Φn
Φn+1 = Φn if ¬ϕn ∈ Φn and ϕn is not of the form ξ([l]ψ)
Φn+1 = Φn + ϕj if ¬ϕn ∈ Φn and ϕn is of the form ξ([l]ψ)
where ϕj is the lowest numbered formula that is of the form ϕj = ¬ξ([U ]ψ)
with U ∈ LAUL, and such that ¬¬ξ([U ]ψ) 6∈ Φn.
First, let us show that such ϕj is well defined. The first important obser-
vation here is that, by Lemma 10, the representation ξ([l]ψ) is unique. The
second important observation is that (assuming that it is defined) each Φn+1
is a consistent theory, since they are of the form Φn + ψ with ¬ψ 6∈ Φn. So
if ¬ξ([l]ψ) ∈ Φn then there must be some ξ([U ]ψ) 6∈ Φn, as otherwise clo-
sure under (R4) would imply that ξ([l]ψ) ∈ Φn. If ξ([U ]ψ) 6∈ Φn then also
¬¬ξ([U ]ψ) 6∈ Φn. The lowest numbered formula with this property is ϕj .
Now let Ψ =
⋃∞
n=0 Φn. We claim that Ψ is a maximal consistent theory
that contains Φ. To this end, first note that {Φn} is an increasing sequence:
Φn ⊆ Φn+1 for all n ∈ N. Now, consider the following.
1. Ψ contains the theory Φ, so it contains all theorems.
2. Take any ϕn ∈ LAAUL. We have either ¬ϕn ∈ Φn ⊆ Ψ or ¬ϕn 6∈ Φn and
therefore ϕn ∈ Φn + ϕn = Φn+1 ⊆ Ψ.
3. If ϕ→ ψ ∈ Ψ and ϕ ∈ Ψ then there is some n ∈ N such that ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φn
and ϕ ∈ Φn. This implies that ψ ∈ Φn, and therefore also ψ ∈ Ψ.
4. If ϕ ∈ Ψ then ¬ϕ 6∈ Ψ. By contradiction: suppose ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ Ψ. Then there
is an n ∈ N such that ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ Φn. That contradicts Φn being a consistent
theory.
5. Ψ is closed under (R4). Proof: suppose ϕn is of the right form to be a
conclusion of (R4), so ϕn = ξ([l]ψ). If ¬ϕn 6∈ Φn then ϕn ∈ Φn+1 ⊆ Ψ,
so Ψ is closed with respect to this instance of (R4). Suppose then that
¬ϕn ∈ Φn. Then ϕj = ¬ξ([U ]ψ) ∈ Φn+1 ⊆ Ψ. By point 4, this implies
that ξ([U ]ψ) 6∈ Ψ, so one of the premises of (R4) is not satisfied. Again,
Ψ is closed with respect to this instance of (R4).
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From points 1, 3 and 5 it follows that Ψ is a theory. From point 1 it follows that
Ψ is an extension of Φ. From 4 it follows that Ψ is consistent. Finally, from 2
it follows that Ψ is maximal.
6.3. Completeness of LAAUL: truth lemma
We can now define the canonical model, and prove a truth lemma for this
model.
Definition 21 (Canonical model). The canonical model Mc = (Wc, Rc, Vc) is
given as follows:
Wc = {Φ | Φ is a maximal consistent theory}
Rc(a) = {(Φ,Ψ) | aΦ ⊆ Ψ}
Vc(p) = {Φ | p ∈ Ψ}
Before considering the truth lemma, let us consider two more small lemmas.
Lemma 18. Let Φ be a theory. If aϕ 6∈ Φ, then there is a maximal consistent
theory Ψ such that aΦ ⊆ Ψ and ϕ 6∈ Ψ.
Proof. By assumption, aϕ 6∈ Φ and therefore ϕ 6∈ aΦ. This implies that
¬¬ϕ 6∈ aΦ, since aΦ contains the tautology ¬¬ϕ → ϕ and is closed under
(R1). As such, aΦ + ¬ϕ is a consistent theory, which can be extended to
a maximal consistent theory Ψ. This Ψ contains ¬ϕ and is consistent, so in
particular ϕ 6∈ Ψ.
Lemma 19. Let Φ be a maximal consistent theory. Then [U ]Φ is also a maximal
consistent theory.
Proof. We know from Lemma 15 that [U ]Φ is a theory. Suppose towards a
contradiction that [U ]Φ is inconsistent. Then p,¬p ∈ [U ]Φ and therefore
[U ]p, [U ]¬p ∈ Φ. But then, using (A4), we have ¬[U ]p ∈ Φ. So Φ is inconsistent,
contradicting our assumptions. The theory [U ]Φ must therefore be consistent.
Suppose then, towards a contradiction, for some ϕ we have ϕ 6∈ [U ]Φ and
¬ϕ 6∈ [U ]Φ. Then [U ]ϕ 6∈ Φ and [U ]¬ϕ 6∈ Φ. By (A4), this implies that
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¬[U ]ϕ 6∈ Φ. But then Φ is not complete, contradicting out assumptions. The
theory [U ]Φ must therefore be complete.
Now, finally, we arrive at the truth lemma.
Lemma 20 (Truth lemma). For every maximal consistent theory Φ and every
ϕ ∈ LAAUL, we have ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if Mc,Φ |= ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on <sd. As base case, suppose d(ϕ) = 0 and
s(ϕ) = 1. Then ϕ = p for some p ∈ P , so it follows immediately from the
definition of Vc(p) that Mc,Φ |= ϕ if and only if p ∈ Φ.
Suppose then as induction hypothesis that d(ϕ) > 0 or s(ϕ) > 1, and that
the lemma holds for all ψ with ψ <sd ϕ. The proof continues with a case
distinction. Note that for every strict subformula ψ of ϕ we have ψ <sd ϕ.
Case 1. Suppose ϕ = ¬ψ. By the induction hypothesis, ψ 6∈ Φ⇔ Mc,Φ 6|= ψ.
By the semantics of AAUL we have Mc,Φ 6|= ψ ⇔ Mc,Φ |= ¬ψ. By
maximality and consistency of Φ we have ψ 6∈ Φ ⇔ ¬ψ ∈ Φ. The three
equivalences together show that ϕ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= ϕ.
Case 2. Suppose ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2. By the induction hypothesis we have Mc,Φ |=
ψi ⇔ ψi ∈ Φ, i ∈ {1, 2}. By the semantics of AAUL we have Mc,Φ |=
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ⇔Mc,Φ |= ψ1 and Mc,Φ |= ψ2. Finally, because Φ is a maximal
consistent theory we have ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Φ ⇔ ψ1 ∈ Φ and ψ2 ∈ Φ. Together,
these equivalences show that ϕ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= ϕ.
Case 3. Suppose ϕ = aψ. We have Mc,Φ |= aψ ⇔ Mc,Ψ |= ψ for all Ψ
such that aΦ ⊆ Ψ. By the induction hypothesis, the latter is equivalent
to ψ ∈ Ψ for all Ψ such that aΦ ⊆ Ψ.
If aψ ∈ Φ then ψ ∈ Ψ for all Ψ such that aΦ ⊆ Ψ. So aψ ∈ Φ ⇒
Mc,Φ |= aψ. Furthermore, by Lemma 18, if aψ 6∈ Φ then there is
some maximal consistent theory Ψ such that ψ 6∈ Ψ and aΦ ⊆ Ψ. By
contraposition, this implies that if ψ ∈ Ψ for all Ψ such that aΦ ⊆ Ψ
then aψ ∈ Φ. So Mx,Φ |= aψ ⇒ aψ ∈ Φ.
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Case 4. Suppose ϕ is of the form [U ]p, [U ]¬ψ, [U ](ψ1∧ψ2), [U ]aψ or [U ][U ′]ψ.
Then ϕ occurs on the left side of one of the axioms (A3) – (A7). Let ϕ′
be the corresponding formula on the right side.
The set Φ is a theory, so it contains (A3) – (A7) and is closed under modus
ponens. So ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ′ ∈ Φ. Furthermore, by the semantics of AAUL
(see Lemma 1), we have Mc,Φ |= ϕ ⇔ Mc,Φ |= ϕ′. Finally, ϕ′ <sd ϕ
(see Lemma 12), so by the induction hypothesis ϕ′ ∈ Φ ⇔ Mc,Φ |= ϕ′.
Together, these three equivalences imply that ϕ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= ϕ.
Case 4. Suppose ϕ = [U ][l]ψ. We treat the two directions of the bi-implication
separately. Firstly, suppose that [U ][l]ψ ∈ Φ. Observe that [U ]([l]ψ →
[U0]ψ) ∈ Φ and [U ]([l]ψ → [U0]ψ) → ([U ][l]ψ → [U ][U0]ψ) for every
U0 ∈ LAUL, since both formulas are derivable in LAAUL. Furthermore, Φ
is closed under (R1), so [U ][U0]ψ ∈ Φ.
The update U0, being an element of LAUL, does not contain any [l] op-
erators. As such, the [l]-depth of [U ][U0]ψ is strictly lower than that
of [U ][l]ψ. We therefore have [U ][U0]ψ <sd [U ][l]ψ, so by the induction
hypothesis our assumption that [U ][U0]ψ ∈ Φ yields the conclusion that
Mc,Φ |= [U ][U0]ψ. By the semantics of AAUL, the latter is equivalent
to Mc ∗ U,Φ |= [U0]ψ. Note that this holds for all U0 ∈ LAUL, so
Mc ∗ U,Φ |= [l]ψ and therefore Mc,Φ |= [U ][l]ψ. We have shown that
[U ][l]ψ ∈ Φ⇒Mc,Φ |= [U ][l]ψ.
Suppose then that Mc,Φ |= [U ][l]ψ. By the induction hypothesis, this
implies that [U ][U0]ψ ∈ Φ for all U0 ∈ LAUL. Taking ξ = [U ]x ∈ NF we
have {ξ([U0]ψ) | U0 ∈ LAUL} ⊆ Φ which, since Φ is closed under (R4),
gives us ξ([l]ψ) = [U ][l]ψ ∈ Φ. We have now shown that Mc,Φ |= [U ][l
]ψ ⇒ [U ][l]ψ ∈ Φ. Together with our previous conclusion, this shows that
[U ][l]ψ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= [U ][l]ψ.
Case 5. Suppose ϕ = [l]ψ. We have [l]ψ ∈ Φ ⇔ ([U0]ψ ∈ Φ for all U0 ∈
LAUL); where ⇒ is due to (A8) and ⇐ is due to (R4). Furthermore,
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since [U0]ψ <
s
d [l]ψ, so we can use the induction hypothesis to obtain
[U0]ψ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= [U0]ψ. Finally, by the semantics of AAUL, we have
(Mc,Φ |= [U0]ψ for all U0 ∈ LAUL) ⇔ Mc,Φ |= [l]ψ. Together, these
equivalences imply that [l]ψ ∈ Φ⇔Mc,Φ |= [l]ψ.
Cases 1 – 5 are exhaustive, and in each case ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ Mc,Φ |= ϕ. This
completes the induction step and thereby the proof.
6.4. LAAUL is sound and complete for |=
The hard parts of the proof are done, now we can quickly prove that LAAUL
is complete.
Theorem 8 (Completeness of LAAUL). For all ϕ ∈ LAAUL, if |= ϕ then ` ϕ.
Proof. By contraposition. Suppose 6` ϕ. Let Φ be the set of theorems, and note
that we have ϕ 6∈ Φ and, since Φ is a theory, ¬¬ϕ 6∈ Φ. This means Φ + ¬ϕ
is a consistent theory, so there is a maximal consistent theory Ψ that contains
Φ + ¬ϕ. We have ϕ 6∈ Ψ and therefore, by Lemma 20, Mc,Ψ 6|= ϕ. As such,
6|= ϕ.
Together with the soundness Theorem 7 this shows that the proof system
LAAUL is sound and complete for arbitrary arrow update logic.
If a finitary axiomatization of a logic exists, it follows that the set of va-
lidities of that logic is recursively enumerable. The axiomatization of AAUL
is infinitary, however, so no such conclusion can be drawn. In fact, it is not
currently known whether the set of validities of AAUL is RE, and therefore
whether the satisfiability problem for AAUL is co-RE. It was shown in in [17]
that the satisfiability problem of AAUL, like that of APAL [18], can encode the
tiling problem. So while we do not know whether the satisfiability problem of
AAUL is co-RE, we do know that is is not RE. In particular, this means that
the satisfiability problem of AAUL is undecidable.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced arbitrary arrow update logic where one can
quantify over arrow updates. We investigated its expressivity relative to other
logics in the family of dynamic epistemic logics, including epistemic logic with
common knowledge. For a finite set of agents and a countably infinite set of
propositional variables we managed to completely chart the expressivity land-
scape over the class of all Kripke models. For one agent and countably many
propositional variable we also completely charted the landscape, mostly because
in S5 all related systems boil down to epistemic logic. For two agents and one
propositional variable, there is only one question remaining and that is one half
of the relative expressivity of APAL and AAUL, and we conjecture that the
logics have non-comparable expressivity.
We also showed that the model checking problem for arbitrary arrow update
logic is PSPACE-complete, and we introduced a sound and complete infinitary
axiomatization for arbitrary arrow update logic.
As far as future research is concerned there are other arbitrary variants
of dynamic modal logics to consider and investigate their relative expressivity
to AAUL, moreover we can further develop variants of APAL present in the
literature and investigate what happens if we replace public announcements by
arrow updates.
Another interesting question for future research is whether we can char-
acterize for which dynamic operators “arbitrary version” are incomparable in
expressivity. As mentioned in Section 4.3, we would generally expect any two
logics using different “arbitrary operators” to be incomparable in expressivity.
Yet the logics RML and AAML turn out to be only as expressive as basic epis-
temic logic, and therefore less expressive than the logics APAL and AAUL. It
would be interesting to know exactly why RML and AAML deviate from the
expected pattern.
Finally, we could add more temporal connectives to AAUL, and study their
interaction with the [l] operator. In particular, if we add CTL-connectives like
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AG and AE we could use AAUL (with the normative interpretation) to study
concepts like liveness, fairness and safety.
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